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ABSTRACT 
 
Banking activities are considered to be important in the economy. The main purpose 
of banks is to ensure that the financial economy is stable. Banking activities are 
heavily regulated and supervised and especially capital structure is under surveillance. 
Regulators assume that capital structure of banks has an impact on banking activities. 
 
This study examines, whether banks’ capital structure affect banks performance. There 
are many studies about capital structure and the results of the studies vary depending 
on the author. While researching banks capital structure, it is meaningful to discuss 
about regulations of banking. Regulations are usually based on known risks in banking 
activities. 
 
Banks, as well as other corporations, performance is measured by different 
performance ratios. Most of the performance ratios are based on the corporations 
profits. Banks performance and amount of capital become important when banking 
activities are struggling. These sorts of situations occur when banks experience crisis.  
 
This study examines how banks capital structure impact on banks performance in three 
different time periods. The impact of capital structure is examined before the financial 
crisis 2007-2008, during the financial crisis 2007-2008 and after the financial crisis. 
The results suggest that capital structure impacts on banks performance during all time 
periods of this study. Banks that are included in this study operate on Nordic area. 
 
 
KEYWORDS: capital structure, banking, performance, banking regulations  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Banking activities have been under the surveillance for the past years. Banking 
activities are examined from various different sources. The regulation and supervision 
of banks is getting more attention. Banks operate as the intermediary between 
investors and borrowers and have additional important tasks in financial markets. One 
of the tasks of the banks is to supply the contracts and allocate the risks (Elomaa, 
Puttonen & Siikala 1996: 13.)  
 
The research of banks capital structure is important because of the domino effect on 
banks. If one bank fails the others tend to fail also and even the whole economies can 
suffer from the failures in the banking sector. By regulating the capital structure 
supervisors can try to prevent the possibility of credit risks and decrease the possibility 
of insolvencies of the banks.  When the financial crisis hit on 2008 the regulators 
begun to review the banking activities. After the crash of Lehman Brothers and the 
financial crisis followed by that, the regulators begun to consider new regulations, 
which will protect the banking activities in the future. Financial crisis of 2007-2008 is 
a good reminder, that the collapse of one bank can lead to collapses in the other banks 
and possible mergers and acquisitions.  
 
This topic is relevant and also interesting on the light of the past and current financial 
situation. It is crucial to aim securing the banking activities and prevent the possible 
crisis in the future. The capital structure of banks as well as the banks performance is 
under the surveillance at this moment. Banking activities draw more attention than 
they did before, since banking is a huge part of the whole financial markets. 
 
 
   1.1. Background and motivation 
 
Banking activities have been under the surveillance for a long time period all over the 
world. In the past, central banks were operating through the government and the 
governments set the laws and regulations for the central banks. Central banks were 
also the banks of the banks as their tasks were tied to economical stability and 
countries monetary actions (Elomaa 1996: 160.) Banks have always impacted on the 
financial markets. However, the regulations on banking have been simplified, but it 
has developed multiple different crisis. For example, in the 1990s the Bank of Finland 
had to rescue the SKOP bank (Kjellman 1994: 15.) The largest world wide financial 
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crisis in the near history is the crisis of 2007-2008. The crisis drove Lehman Brothers 
to bankruptcy, which led to crisis in other banks. Some banks have survived from 
difficult time periods, while others suffer from enormous losses. 
 
The motivation of this study is to research, what kind of impact does the capital 
structure have on banks’ performance. The study of Berger and Bouwman (2013)  
suggest that there are both positive and negative impacts depending on performance 
variable, although the study of Demiguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) suggests that there 
is no impact. The impact in different among variables. The main purpose of this study 
is to find out whether the capital structure of the Nordic banks affect on Nordic banks 
performance in the financial crisis 2007-2008 and after the crisis period. This study 
includes banks from Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Iceland is excluded 
from this study, since its banking crisis in 2008 might have an impact on the results of 
this study. During the banking crisis in Iceland three of the biggest banks of Iceland 
collapsed.  
 
Most of the studies on banks capital structure and performance are done with U.S. or 
EU data. This study is unique since it studies only Nordic countries. Nordic countries 
are small and their banking industry is integrated, which makes it interesting to 
research the impact on only these countries. In addition, this study uses data from 
2005-2014, so the data is quite new. Previous studies of Berger and Bouwman (2013) 
and Demiguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) use data from 1980’s to 2010.  
 
 
  1.2. Previous main studies 
 
Many studies of this subject suggest that capital structure affects on banks 
performance and market value. However, the theories of the optimal capital structure 
propose that the capital structure does not matter. Modigliani and Miller were the first 
researchers, who investigated the capital structure of the corporations. They suggest 
that the capital structure has no impact on corporates market value (Modigliani & 
Miller 1958.)  
 
The tradeoff theory suggests that market or regulatory forces are suspected to drive 
insurers to hold adequate amount of capital to maintain tolerable insolvency risk. 
According to this theory the companies hold as much debt as they can in order to 
maintain the optimal insolvency risk. The pecking order theory suggests that 
informational asymmetries between companies and investors imply that external 
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capital is more expensive than internal capital. So companies prefer to use internal 
capital first and if that is not enough, then they rely on external capital (Cheng, Weiss 
2012: 4-6.) 
 
Unlike other studies, the study of Demiguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) researched 
banks financial structures impact on bank performance over 1990-1997. Their study 
suggests that there is not impact between these two variables. The study of Demirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga (2010) suggest that there is a positive relation between bank equity 
and profitability and Berger and Bouwman (2013) show that bank equity improves the 
performance of medium and large banks especially during banking crises. The study of 
Berger and Bouwman includes banks from U.S. and banking crises that occurred 
between 1984 and 2010. The study of Beltratti and Palandino (2015) researches bank 
leverage and profitability. The study focuses on optimal leverage ratio over time and is 
done with banks of large countries for example Australia, US and Germany. 
 
The main studies discuss the capital structure in many different ways and of the 
optimal capital structure varies among the researchers. However, in the banking 
industry, studies show that the capital structure matters and that higher amount of 
equity capital usually results better performance. 
 
 
   1.3. Research problem 
 
The purpose of this study is to find out, what kind of impact does the capital structure 
have on banks’ performance. Previous studies show that there is a positive relationship 
between bank equity and profitability. This research is done to find out does the capital 
structure of the Nordic banks affect on Nordic banks performance in the financial 
crisis 2007-2008 and after the crisis period. Banking activities are supervised and 
banks performance is observed regularly by different sources. Are regulations and 
legal activities meaningful, if the bank capital structure does not matter on their 
profitability and performance? This thesis is limited to research the capital structure 
and performance as well as these factors functioning together. The thesis has three 
hypothesis’s: 
 
H1: Banks’ capital structure before the financial crisis of 2007-2008 impacts on banks 
performance during the crisis period.  
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H2: Banks’ capital structure during the financial crisis of 2007-2008 impacts on banks 
performance after the crisis period 
 
H3: Banks’ capital structure affect bank performance over time 
 
The first hypothesis is similar to the study of Berger and Bouwman (2013). Their 
study researched how does the capital structure before the financial crisis impact on 
bank performance during the crisis periods.  Hypothesis two expands the study of 
Berger and Bouwman (2013) by adding after crisis period to the study. It is expected 
that financial crisis decrease the values of capital structure variables and therefore it is 
interesting to see how two years of low values affect banks ability to survive from the 
financial crisis. Hypothesis three is similar to the study of Demiguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2000). The crisis period in this study is the same that is used in the study of 
Fahlenbrach, Rüdiger and Stulz (2011). The performance of the banks is measured by 
various ratios and profitability calculations. 
 
 
          1.4. Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis overviews the capital structure of banks. Chapter two reviews capital 
structure theories and studies. After this the thesis observes the forming of banks 
return. Banks capital structure is influenced by the regulations and standards. The 
standards, which are reviewed in this study are Basel I, Basel II and Basel III. Chapter 
two will also cover the risks in banking sector. 
  
In chapter three banks performance will be added to the study. At first the measures of 
banks performance and profitability will be presented. After this the performance is 
viewed before, during and after the financial crisis 2007-2008.  
 
The data and research methodologies are represented after the theory part of the thesis 
in chapter four. Chapter four includes the summary statistics and the main study. The 
results are presented in chapter four as text and tables. As the data this paper uses 
Bankscope. Data is collected from years 2005-2014. Chapter 5 concludes this study.  
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2. BANKS’ CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND BANKING 
 
Banks have an important role in supplying finances in financial markets. Banks supply 
finances between surplus and deficit economies among with the other organizations 
that operate in financial markets (Elomaa 1996: 13.) Because of this, banks have strict 
regulations of the capital structure. Banks are supervised by many institutions. For 
example, the Financial Supervisory Authority supervises whether banks follow given 
regulations or not. Banks differ from other corporations in the markets. They have a 
chance to use government secured loans and they also have lower bankruptcy costs 
than regular companies (Harding, Lian & Ross 2012.) Banks’ capital is divided to 
equity and liabilities. 
 
Since banks’ role is to supply finances between market participants there is a chance 
of a principal-agent problem. Customers might not be aware of banks’ financial 
situation and if the bank collapses, investors might end up loosing all of their 
investments. Banks are also a huge part of the economy, so collapse in one bank might 
lead to collapses in another banks and eventually spread through to the whole 
economy. Usually government tries to save banks from collapse, since the effect of  
the collapse to the whole economy is enormous. Moral hazard problem is well 
recognized in banking regulations and supervision. Because of the moral hazard 
problem, there are strict regulations on capital structure (Ross 1973.)  
 
 
   2.1. Theories of optimal capital structure 
 
Modigliani and Miller (1958) are the first researchers who examine the capital 
structure of the company. In the year 1958 they created a theorem that suggests that 
speculating with the capital structure does not add company value. Company value is 
independent from company’s capital structure. In theory, the value of the company is 
based on the power of earnings and assets. However, the value of the company is 
independent from the financial source of investments and dividend policy. The study 
assumes that the economy is under perfect competition. In perfect competition there 
are no taxes, transaction costs, bankruptcy costs, differences between loan rates, and 
information asymmetry. In perfectly competitive markets the leverage level of the 
company does not impact in its’ earnings before interest and taxes (Modigliani & 
Miller 1958.) 
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In Modigliani, Miller theorem there are no taxes or bankruptcy costs. In this case the 
weighted average capital cost (WACC) should be constant even if the capital structure 
of the company changes. Capital structure should not affect company’s stock price, 
since there are no advantages or changes, if the company raises its leverage ratio. 
Because of this, capital structure is not a significant factor on company market value 
(Modigliani 1958.) 
 
(1) !"## = !"#$%&!""#$" ∗ !"#$ !! !"#$%& + !"#$!""#$" ∗ !"#$ !" !"#$ ∗ (1− !") 
(Kinnunen, Laitinen, Laitinen, Leppiniemi, Puttonen 2010.) 
 
The second theorem of Modigliani and Miller adds taxes to the model. New theory 
assumes that using leverage is useful until the optimal capital structure is reached. 
Theory takes the benefits of taxes in interest payments into consideration, since cuts 
on interests are tax-free. Especially bond issuance lowers tax responsibilities 
significantly. Dividend payments do not lower the tax responsibilities of the company. 
The real cost of interest in bond issuances is lower than nominal interest rate because 
of the advantages on tax cuts. According to the new theory, higher leverage ratio is 
better to company, because of the tax cuts (Modigliani 1963.) 
 
The first theory of Modigliani and Miller suggests that the capital structure does not 
have an impact on company’s market value. The second theory suggests that the 
higher leverage ratio is better choice, if company wants to increase its market value. 
High leverage ratio is still effecting on company’s chance to get more debt.  
 
Tradeoff theory states that market or regulatory forces are assumed to drive 
corporations to hold enough capital to maintain an acceptable insolvency risk. 
Corporations’ job is to balance between the benefits against holding capital and reach 
the optimal insolvency risk. Corporations with lower insolvency risk are assumed to 
make more profit, than corporations with higher insolvency risk. Low insolvency risk 
indicates that the corporation is more stable and because of that it is considered to be 
“safe”.  Safe corporations can add safety premium to their prices (Cummins and 
Danzon, 1997). However, holding capital is costly to corporation. Corporations’ 
capital structure is not always optimal because of the high costs of equity and 
companies tradeoff between capital and insolvency risk (Cheng and Weiss 2012). 
 
Pecking order theory assumes, that informational asymmetries between equity 
providers and firm managers leads to that external capital is most likely more costly 
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than internal capital (Myers, 1984; Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein, 1993.) Therefore 
firms tend to use internal capital first while doing financial investments. If a firm is 
required to use external capital its’ next choice will be safe debt. Issuing equity is the 
last choice of a firm, because of the high cost (Myers & Majluf, 1984.) This theory 
does not give an answer to optimal capital structure, since firms prefer to acquire 
financial slack for future investments. Current capital levels are directly related to the 
net changes in the firm’s internal and external cash flows (Cheng 2012.) 
 
2.1.1. Previous literature 
 
Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) study the choice between equity and debt. They 
assume that corporations set their capital structure to the level, where the corporations 
can move towards to their target leverage-level. The theory of Hovakimian et al. 
(2001) is based on the assumption, that corporations have obstacles on moving 
towards to the targeted leverage-level. Target-level might change when the 
profitability of the corporation and the price of the corporations’ share change. Based 
on the research, Hovakimian et al show that the past returns are important. With the 
past returns, corporations can observe leverage-ratios. Study shows that corporations 
show interest on moving towards targeted leverage-ratios, when they have to choose 
between the repurchase of equity and paying back the debt (Hovakimian, Opler and 
Titman 2001.) 
 
Faulkender and Petersen (2006) discuss whether the source of capital affects on capital 
structure or not. The research shows that firms that have access to the public bond 
markets are significantly more leveraged than other firms. Source of firms’ debt and 
possible access to bond markets influences strongly to firm capital structure. The firms 
that have access to public bond market are more likely to meet regulatory 
requirements, since their financial information is easily accessible. The firms with 
access to bond markets are however making their decisions on bond issuances based 
on capital markets (Faulkender and Petersen 2006.) 
 
Firms’ management can affect the capital structure of the firm. Berger, Ofek and 
Yermack (1997) research the stabile managements’ impact on firms’ capital structure. 
Their research proposes that a long-term CEO usually avoids making a new debt. 
Research shows that the leverage ratio is lower, if the CEO does not have any pressure 
of owning company and if the CEO does not have several different incentives. 
Leverage ratio is also lower when the CEOs’ actions are not actively supervised. The 
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analysis of the change in leverage ratio shows that the amount of leverage rises when 
traditions are changed and the changes are threat to management. Traditions can be 
changed by failures in business, replacement of the CEO or the change in the largest 
shareholders (Berger, Ofeck and Yermack 1997.) 
 
DeAngelo and Stulz suggest that banks should have as much debt as they could. 
Banks’ purpose is to provide safe debt. Because of this banks have a major social role 
in society. Banks’ debt is assumed to be safe, because banks’ strategy is to create 
liquidity. Liquidity creation is based on a risk management. Banks manage their risks 
by hedging against the losses. The study assumes that there is no taxes, agency 
problems or the risk of moral hazard problems. Researchers agree that the model of 
extremely high leverage is not reliable in real world conditions. Theoretically banks 
should have as much debt as the can get (DeAngelo and Stulz 2015.) 
 
Konziol and Lawrence (2009) study the risks of the banks and banks optimal capital 
structure. Researchers suggest that the evaluation of banks’ risks should be considered 
on banks regulations. Banks try to optimize their capital structure by changing the 
volume of deposits in a long run (Konziol and Lawrenz 2009.) In reality banks do not 
hold minimum requirements of capital, but they do have voluntary capital buffers 
(Lindquist 2004.)  
 
Banks change the amount of deposits voluntarily, because acting like this, banks can 
control their own leverage ratio and prevent breaking regulators rules. Banks raise the 
amount of deposits when they want to benefit from valuable investments. Because of 
the arrangement costs, banks do not change the amount of deposits frequently 
(Konziol 2009.) 
 
However, significant number of banks have a target level of capital ratio. The study of 
Memmel and Raupach (2010) suggests that banks with a target capital ratio 
compensate with lower target ratios of another rates. Banks’ capital ratios are 
significantly lower than regular non-financial firms’. Supervisory authorities and 
rating agencies force banks to control a minimum capital ratio. Lowest regulatory limit 
for the total-capital ratio in for example Germany is eight percent, rating agencies, 
however, want banks to hold a certain ratio of Tier 1 capital. The amount of Tier 1 
capital is effecting on rating. Study implies, that there is a certain capital ratio that 
management reaches (Memmel and Raupach 2010.) 
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Harding, Lian and Ross (2012) research the optimal capital structure of banks. 
According to their study, banks that are heavily regulated tend to keep their capital 
level above the minimum requirements voluntarily. Their findings suggest that there is 
an optimal minimum capital ratio (Harding, Lian and Ross 2012.) 
 
Capital structure studies suggest various different solutions for optimal capital 
structure. In some studies the maximum leverage is optimal or the structure does not 
matter at all. On the other hand, large amount of leverage arises the risk of insolvency. 
Equity and debt have different costs and the choice between them might not be easy. 
In theory, banks should choose the balance of holding safe capital, in other words, 
equity and risky assets. Source of capital seems to affect banks’ willingness to follow 
the regulations. Banks with access to public bond markets are usually following the 
restrictions carefully. Banks are usually going towards their target level of debt and 
equity, while still counting possible outcomes and possibilities of loss. Management 
and stock prices seem to have an impact on banks decision on capital structure. 
Usually banks prefer to have a buffer against possible losses and they choose to hold 
equity above the minimum requirements voluntarily.  
 
 
  2.2. Forming of the bank return    
 
Banks create their wealth from deposits. The major income of banks comes from debt 
issuance to the public (Elomaa 1996:15.) Banks collect interest rates from the debt 
they have issued. Interest rates are usually tied to interest rate indices, for example to 
euribor. Euribor-rates are calculated daily with the quotations of highly rated large 
banks in European region (Pohjola 2010:103.) Banks add premium on top of the 
interest rate, which is called a prime-interest rate. Prime-interest rate is banks self 
defined reference rate on the debt they issue. Some of the banks activities come from 
outside the balance sheet. These sorts of activities are usually securities and contracts, 
which involve financial organizing (Elomaa 1996: 16.) 
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Table 1. Simplified commercial bank balance sheet (Casu, Giranrdrone & Molyneux 
2006: 197.) 
    
Assets Liabilities 
Cash Deposits: retail 
Liquid assets Deposits: wholesale 
Loans  
Other investments Equity 
Fixed assets Other capital terms 
Total assets Total liabilities and equity 
 
 
Banks profitability can be led from banks’ income statement. Banks’, as well as other 
firms, profit is the difference between income and costs.  
 
 
Table 2. A simplified bank income statement (Casu 2006: 206.)   
 
A  Interest income 
B  Interest expenses 
C= (A-B) Net interest income (or spread)   
D  Provision for loan losses (PPL) 
E= (C-D) Net interest income after PPL   
F  Non-interest income 
G  Non-interest expense 
H= (F-G) Net non-interest income    
I= (E+H) Pre-tax net operating profit 
L  Securities gains (losses) 
M=(I+-L) Profits before taxes    
N  Taxes 
O  Extraordinary items 
P= (M-N-O) Net profit     
Q  Cash dividends 
R= (P-Q) Retained profit 
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Banks profits can be divided in interest profits and bank security provisions, profits 
from changes of values in income statement, profits from customer service and profits 
from sales and purchases. Profits are channeled to main functions of banking 
activities. The main functions are banking for customers, money and capital market 
actions and banks’ investments and holdings. Banks’ profitability and returns can be 
monitored as whole or through the service networks. This requires targeting 
customers’ contracts to the service network and balancing expenses on inner charges 
and refunds (Elomaa 1996:34.) 
 
 
  2.3. Banking sector in Nordic countries 
 
Nordic capital markets are a part of international capital markets. However, Nordic 
banking sector is slightly different from European banking sectors, since the major of 
foreign bank subsidiaries comes from other Nordic country. Nordic capital markets are 
significantly similar to European ones, but there are special characteristics in each 
country. Because Nordic banks have customers all over the Nordic area, the banking 
sector in all countries is integrated. Nordea and Danske Bank have the widest 
customer base in all Nordic countries. Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden have 
couple of the biggest banks that dominate the banking industry in each country. Even 
though there is a huge amount of banks in each country, the market is dominated by 
the largest banks (Finanssialan Keskusliitto 2009.) 
 
All of the Nordic countries have different currencies. Finland is the only one using 
Euros. Regulations from European Central Bank are only affecting the Finnish 
banking system, however, the regulations are similar in each country. Norway is 
differing from other Nordic countries. It is the only country, excluding Iceland, which 
is not a part of European Union. Norway still has a similar regulation system as all the 
other Nordic countries.  
 
 
   2.4. National and international regulations on banking 
 
There have always been rules and regulations on banking. Banking activities are 
limited by laws and settlements. For example in Finland monetary markets have been 
strictly regulated until the end of the 1980s’. The Central bank of Finland controlled 
the interest rates and foreign exchange rates and also exercised strict monetary policy 
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(Elomaa 1996.) Nowadays, the regulations of banking activities come also from 
European Central Bank and from the Bank of International Settlements. All of the 
Nordic banks follow Basel accords. 
 
2.4.1. Denmark and FSA 
 
The main task of the Danish FSA (Finanstilsynet) is the supervision of financial 
enterprises such as banks, mortgage-credit institutions, pension- and insurance 
agencies. The most important task of FSA is to monitor that the enterprises have 
acceptable amount of equity funds to cover their risks. The FSA also supervises the 
securities markets. The Danish FSA assists in forming financial legislation and issues 
managerial orders for the financial area. FSA is responsible for collecting and 
distributing statistics and key figures for the financial sector. FSA follows 
international standards issued by the Basel-Committee (Finanstilsynet 2015.) 
 
2.4.2. Finland and Financial Supervisory Authority 
 
Financial Supervisory Authority of Finland, later FSA-FIN co-operates with the Bank 
of Finland. Regulations for the Bank of Finland are pointed out by the ministry of 
finance. The tasks of FSA-FIN are supervision of financial enterprises, promote 
acceptable procedures and increase the knowledge about financial markets. FSA-FIN 
also gives licenses for enterprises, which operate in the financial markets and 
supervises the licensed enterprises. All of the financial enterprises are obligated to 
provide all necessary materials for FSA-FIN, so it can supervise and regulate for 
example banking activities. FSA-FIN is entitled to all financial and risk-management 
information of financial institutions. FSA-FIN co-operates with foreign EEA-
supervisory authorities and follows the instructions of European Parliament (Laki 
Finanssivalvonnasta 19.12.2008/878.) 
 
2.4.3. Sweden and Finansinspektionen 
 
Finansinspektionen, later FI, supervises and analyses trends in the financial markets. 
FI estimates the financial state of individual companies, the various sectors and the 
financial market. FI examines the risks and regulations in financial companies and 
supervises compliances with acts, laws and other regulations. Companies that offer 
financial services require a license from the FI. The main task of FI is to issue 
regulations and general guidelines and evaluate existing legislation. FI supervises 
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compliances with Swedish Insider Act that investigates cases of financial 
manipulation. FI ensures that companies provide clear and complete information to 
their customers. FI prepares rules for financial reporting by financial companies 
(Finansinspektionen 2015.) 
 
2.4.4. Norway and Finanstilsynet  
  
Finanstilsynet, later FI-NO, is an independent government agency that builds on laws 
and decisions that come forth from the Parliament, The Government and the Ministry 
of Finance. International standards for financial supervision and regulation come via 
FI-NO. Because of the supervisory role, FI-NO aims to promote financial stability and 
orderly market conditions and to implant confidence that financial contracts will be 
followed and services are completed as intended. FI-NO deals with problems that may 
arise in financial institutes. FI-NO determines that Norwegian companies must allow 
competitive conditions with other EEA member countries. FI-NO is responsible for 
the supervision of banks in Norway (Finantilsynet 2015.) 
 
2.4.5. Regulations from European Union 
 
European Central Bank, later EBC, operates as a central bank of EU nations central 
banks. The activities and tasks of EBC are described in the operation contract of EU. 
The basic tasks of EBC are to define and implement EUs’ monetary policy, carry the 
currency market, control the funds and contribute flawless payment system. EBCs’ 
main task is to control and keep the financial system stable (European Central Bank 
2015.) 
 
Financial system needs to be stable in order to European economies to be stable. There 
are many risks in the financial system. ECB tries to find out and be aware of the 
possible risks. Especially financial crisis on year 2008, has shaken the credibility of 
the financial system. The general risk in banking is credit loss risk that arises 
especially in bad economic states. If banks focus on financing certain industries there 
is a risk that banks suffer credit losses if the industry has difficulties. Banks might also 
invest their equity on stock or bond markets and thus be exposed to drops on market 
prices (European Central Bank 2015.) 
 
Financial institutes are in charge of protecting themselves against financial crisis. They 
should manage their capability to operate and manage their solvency. Risk 
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management is a vital way to protect institutions from financial crises. Authorities 
have their own ways to prevent crises’. They create regulations and rules for financial 
institutions. Authorities are obligated to follow and evaluate financial institutions and 
thus control weaknesses and threads of financial institutions (European Central Bank 
2015.)  
 
 
   2.5. Bank of International Settlements and Basel Committee 
 
The main purpose of the Bank of International Settlements, later BIS, is to serve 
central banks on monetary actions and financial stability on international level. BIS is 
the bank for central banks. BIS carry out its’ task by enabling communication and by 
easing co-operation with the central banks. BIS supports communication with 
supervisor authorities and offers leading researches of communication methods 
between central banks and financial supervisory authorities. BIS works as major party 
for central banks with their financial transactions and offers to be reliable agent on 
international financial operations (BIS 2015.) 
 
Basel Committee operates on Bank of International Settlements. Basel Committee is a 
worldwide adjuster for banking regulations and it offers co-operation on the matters of 
bank supervisory. Basel Committee has adjusted basic standards three times. These are 
Basel I, Basel II and Basel III. 
 
  
23	
2.5.1. Basel I 
 
Basel I is adjusted on year 1988 and it mainly focused on credit risk by dividing 
banks’ capital on four different risk categories. Basel I divides capital in two 
categories. Tier 1 capital consists of cash reserves and stock and share capital. Tier 2 
capital consists of credit losses, subordinated loans and hybrid loans. According to 
Basel I, banks’ should have same amount of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital (Balin 2008.) 
 
Risk weights on Basel I are 0 %, 20 %, 50 % and 100 %. 0 % is the risk-free option, 
20 % is the credit risk between banks, 50 % is the risk of the mortgages and 100 % is 
the risk of corporate loans. Banks are obligated to keep at least 8 % of risk-weighted 
assets or 4 % of Tier 1 assets (Balin 2008.) 
 
Basel I is criticized a lot. Basel I is said to be too narrow to ensure financial stability 
on international financial system and that it only covers credit risk. The 
implementation of Basel I is also criticized since bank authorities did not publish and 
implement it well. Basel I is not designed well enough since banks can go around the 
standards of the risk weights and thus take substantial risks (Balin 2008.) 
 
2.5.2. Basel II 
 
In the year 1999 Basel committee decides to develop Basel II regulations. Basel II 
enlarges its scale significantly from the first Basel. It does not focus on only credit 
risk. Basel II introduces the demand of minimum capital. In the first Basel banks had 
an opportunity to increase their risks via their subsidiaries. Basel II offers three 
different ways to analyze risk from banks’ assets. First standardized rule is that banks 
should use market values instead of book values while calculating the risk weights. 
New risk weights are from AAA to AAA- 0 %, from A to A- 20 %, from BBB+ to 
BBB- 50 % and from BB+ to BB- 100 %. If evaluation goes below B- its risk weight 
is 150 %. Non-evaluated debt is weighted as 100 % (Balin 2008.) 
 
The purpose of Basel II is to encourage banks to develop their own inner risk 
management together with regulators. Since banks must hold 6 % of risk weighted 
assets, Basel committee offers opportunity to hold less reserves and gain larger profit, 
if banks agree on inner risk management. Banks with large and complicated activities 
may define their own credit repayment models. Both models, risk management and 
own repayment models, help bankers and regulators in many ways. Regulations 
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encourage banks to accept customers from different risk ratings. Customers with lower 
risk rate get lower risk weight. Lower risk weight lead to less reserves giving banks a 
change to higher profits (Balin 2008.) 
 
Basel II intervene on banks operative risk. According to regulations banks should hold 
15 % from three-year average on gross income. Banks must also hold certain cash 
reserve so the bank can protect itself from operational risks. The amount of cash 
reserve depends on the kind of activities bank has. If bank is, for example a 
commercial bank, it must hold 15 % of cash reserves. Last risk covered by Basel II is 
the market risk. Market risk is weighted based on the maturities of loans. Risk arises as 
the maturity of loan arises (Balin 2008.) 
 
Basel II regulations are more extensive than Basel I. Despite of this Basel II has also 
received criticism. The problem of Basel II is that it cannot be applied worldwide and 
that all banks do not need to follow it. Basel II is designed to be exercised in Europe 
but for example in United States it is exercised in only few of the largest banks. Basel 
II has also been criticized because the benefits of the regulations are not equally spread 
(Suomen Pankki 2003.) 
 
Basel bank supervisory committee has noticed weaknesses in Basel II. Basel 
committee published new strategy to improve Basel II on year 2008. Improvement is 
needed because of the financial crisis. After financial crisis started Basel committee 
noticed that all of the systematic risks were not noticed in Basel I and Basel II. 
Regulations have been based on the safety of single institutions. New targets of Basel 
committee are for example raising the amount of capital in banking system, raising the 
quality of banks own assets and building a larger capital buffers (Jokivuolle and 
Vauhkonen 2010.) 
 
2.5.3. Basel III 
 
Financial crisis that started in the year 2007, is the reason for developing the third 
Basel accord. Basel III observes regulations from many different countries so there 
would be negotiation about new common way of governance, future of the banking 
activities and risk management. Basel III focuses on the quality and quantity of capital 
and enlargement of capital regulations on a certain types of risks. The purpose of Basel 
III is to introduce worldwide liquidity standards and set the capital levels that can 
decrease systematic risk in the worldwide financial markets. In Basel III banks equity 
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levels have been raised. The core capital has been raised from 2 % to 4,5 % and the 
demand of Tier 1 capital has been raised from 4 % to 6 %. In new regulations banks 
should keep their gearing ratio on 7 % and thus capital ratio should be 10,5 % (Went 
2010.) 
 
Basel III has also been criticized. According to Nindell-Wignall and Atkinson (2010) 
Basel III has not a clear model that banks should exercise. Also regulations and tax 
arbitrage have not been perceived. Banks still have a chance to grow their debt by 
converting debts to credits and sell them forward to other banks. These credit risks are 
not included in the risk weights of Basel III because they are not risks to bank 
anymore. These sorts of credits are out of reach of the regulators and are almost 
impossible to control (Nindell-Wignall and Atkinson 2010.) 
 
 
   2.6. Risks in banking 
 
Most of the banks profits consist by taking and controlling risk. Banks risks are 
banking activities risks that include clients and other risks. Other risks involve for 
example risks in derivatives. Banks risks may also come from inside the banking 
activities and resources. These sorts of risks are documentation, malpractice, 
continuous and damage risks. Banks image affects on banks’ risk since customers 
might think that bank is a way riskier than it actually is. Customers’ false image of 
bank might increase common distrust towards the banks. This might cause major 
damage to bank even though banks’ actions were not risky at all. Risks and occasional 
credit losses are a part of banking activities and those cannot be removed without 
decreasing activities significantly. The knowledge in banks is the key for risk 
management (Elomaa 1996:34.) 
 
According to Elomaa (1996) interest rate risk and refinance risks are the most essential 
risks of banks. Banks financial margin profit forms from subtraction of the profits of 
interest rates and the cost of interest rates. Profits from interest rates come from issued 
loans and costs of interest rates come from debts. Since interest rates are tied in 
margins and interest bases and the maturities of interest rates are different, banks are 
open to interest rate risks. When risk occurs changes in interest rates and interest bases 
affect on banks financial margin profit since the planned profits are not in line with the 
real profits. The more there is a risk in interest rates the more vulnerable banks’ 
financial margin profit is to interest rate changes. Banks interest rates are also 
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affecting their market values and the sales margin of stocks. The market value of bank 
forms from subtraction of the net present value of debts and receivables. Since net 
present value is calculated by discounting, changes in discount rates are affecting 
banks market value. 
 
(1)   !" = !"(!!!)! ,!ℎ!"! 
 
  Kn= capital growth in n period 
  Ko= initial capital 
  1+i= interest factor of a period 
 
Refinance risk occurs in banks basic duty, maturity transformation. Refinance risk 
occurs when receivables mature slower than their financing banks need to renew their 
financing. Renewing the funding includes unawareness and thus it affects on banks’ 
risk. New funding might be expensive because of the changes in markets or banks 
(Elomaa 1996:54-44.) 
 
Casu, Girardone and Molyneux have divided banks risks in nine different categories. 
These are credit risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risk, currency risk, market risk, 
country specific risk, operational risk, outside of accounting risk and other risks. Basel 
committee has defined credit risk by the default of credits issued by banks. Banks face 
credit risks from bonds and other deposits also. If bank owns a large share of certain 
state or company, bank might suffer huge credit losses. When companies go bankrupt 
it is possible for banks to not get any of their credits back. Banks can follow states and 
companies credit risks from Standard & Poor’s or Moody’s. These companies evaluate 
credit risks. Credits that banks issue to households, is not rated. Banks need to evaluate 
household risks with their own credit criteria (Casu 2006: 260-261.) 
 
The interest rate risk of banks forms from the subtraction of todays’ interest rate level 
and futures interest rate level. If banks have debt that has low interest rate today and 
the interest rate rises in future there will be losses on banking activities. If interest rate 
rises on a credit, which bank has issued, there will be profits. Raise on interest rate risk 
increases the volatility of bank (Casu 2006: 261-262.) Volatility means swings on 
profits (Nikkinen, Rothovius and Sahlström 2008:28.)  
 
In liquidity risk, banks asset are not liquid enough. Banks do not have enough reserves 
that it can transform to cash if it is necessary. Banks suffer from liquidity risk daily 
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when they receive deposits and issue them forward for loans. Banks must hold suitable 
amount of liquid reserves because the depositors may unintentionally think that bank 
is not performing well. In this case, depositors may want to withdraw their deposits. 
Banks do not hold the amount of all deposits in their reserves, which may cause a huge 
risk. One misunderstanding may lead to mistrust since banks are not able to accord all 
the deposits. Crisis in one bank may lead to crisis in other banks. This is called a bank 
run. Because of one misunderstanding, banks’ activities may be supervised (Casu 2006 
264-265; Pohjola 2010: 103.) 
 
The currency risk occurs because banks hold their assets in other currencies. Currency 
risk can be compensated with derivatives. Market risk is caused by the change on 
short-term asset values. Assets can be stocks, derivatives or bonds. Market risk can be 
divided in two parts. In systematic market risk all assets have changed their values. In 
unsystematic market risk only one or few market instrument have changed their 
values. Country risk occurs when regulations and changes in countries affect on 
banking activities. Country risk is not really significant since credits, that are issued to 
countries, are less risky than credits issued to households or corporations (Casu 2006: 
266.271.)  
 
In operational risk the whole banking activity is under a risk. Operational risk can be 
risk in the banking system, risk in the technology or risks in management. Operational 
risk can arise from inside or outside of the bank. Even natural disasters may affect on 
operational risk. The risks outside of accounting are explained by contracts of 
guarantees and non-traditional banking activities. Other risks in banking are inflation 
risk, risks in bank-to-bank markets, risk from changes in regulation and competition 
risk (Casu 2006: 272-274.) 
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3. THE AFFECT OF BANKS CAPITAL STRUCTURE ON BANKS 
PERFORMANCE 
 
Performance is an important indicator when observing companies or banking 
activities. Performance can be measured with different indicators depending on how 
one defines performance. Many studies on performance use profitability calculations.  
 
 
   3.1. Measuring the banks capital structure 
 
Banks’ capital structure can be measured by several different ratios. By calculating the 
ratios, investors get reliable information about banks’ current financial stability. Banks 
are usually more leveraged than other corporations, since most of the banks profits 
come from the difference between funds lent and borrowed (Casu 2006: 204 Choudhry 
2012: 159). The most popular capital structure measures are leverage ratio, relative 
indebtedness ratio and deposit ratio.  
 
(2)  !"#"$%&" !"#$% = !"#$%&!"#$"!"%"&' 
 
Leverage ratio is satisfying, when it is between 20 % and 40 %. Less than 20 % of the 
ratio implies poor capital structure as more than 40 % implies good capital structure of 
the company (Kinnunen, Laitinen, Laitinen, Leppiniemi & Puttonen 2010: 63.) 
 
(3)   !"#$%&'" !"#$%&$#"$'' = !"#$"!"%"&'!"#"$%"  
 
The value of relative indebtedness is satisfactory when it is between 40 % and 80 %. 
More than 100 % of relative indebtedness implies poor capital structure and is a sign 
of unreliable company. Relative indebtedness is a ratio that can be interpreted 
differently in different industries. In banking industry the amount of debt is higher 
than in other industries. The reason for this is the characteristics of banking (Kinnunen 
2010: 63.) 
 
 (4)  !"#$%&' !"#$% = !"!#$ !"#$%& !" !"#$%! !"#$%!"!#$ !"#$%& !" !"#$!!!"#$%&'% 
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   3.2. Measuring banks performance 
 
Bank performance is measured by different profitability calculations. The most 
common ones are ROE (return on equity), ROA (return on assets), NIM (net interest 
marginal) and C/I (costs-profits) ratio. Performance calculations provide information 
for parties that are interested on bank activities. Parties that are interested on banking 
activities are: shareholders, loan providers, credit rating agencies, regulators, financial 
markets and other agencies that operate in financial markets. ROA is used for 
measuring how much net profit generates assets. The acceptable value of ROA is 
around 1 % (Casu 2006: 212-215). 
 
(5)  !"# = !"# !"#$%& !"!#$ !""#$" 
 
The most important indicator of banks profitability and growth potential is ROE. ROE 
measures shareholder profits on invested equity. ROE can be calculated as pre cents. 
The good value of ROE is over 10 %. Great performing banks usually have set the 
goal for ROE to over 15 %. In this study ROE is denoted as ROAE. 
 
(6)  !"# = !"# !"#$%& !"!#$ !"#$%& 
 
NIM measures banks interest profits in monetary units per assets. High value of NIM 
indicates that there is an inequality between the deposit interests and debt. NIM has 
been decreased in several banking markets, which implicates increased competition in 
deposit and debt markets. The price that bank pays for deposits is close to the price 
that banks pay for their loans (Casu 2006: 214). 
 
(7) !"# = [(!"#$%$&# !"#$%& − !"#$%$&# !"#!!"#$) !"!#$ !""#$"] 
 
C/I is a quick estimator of efficiency. C/I measures the ratio of banks’ other costs and 
banks’ all incomes (Casu 2006: 214). 
 
(8)  ! ! = !"! !"#$%$&# !"#!$%!% (!"# !"#$%$&# !"#$%& + !"! !"#$%$&# !"#$%&) 
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  3.3. Different types of banking crisis 
 
Bank runs are a result of a mass hysteria. A large number of depositors, fearing that 
their bank is about to fail and thus they try to withdraw all of their savings within a 
short time. The bank run is caused by public, which suspect that banks’ go insolvent. 
When a bank run appears, banks basically run out of cash, since they do not hold all of 
their deposits in cash. Banks lend out most of the deposits and during the bank run 
they are forced to sell their assets to meet depositors demands. Bank might not have 
enough reserves to sell. This might cause, that banks need to sell their loans at loss and 
this might cause bank insolvency and bank failure (Casu 2006: 162.) 
 
Financial crisis may also be caused by other factors. Risk of a moral hazard is one of 
them. In moral hazard, banks are relying that government or other institution will 
rescue their activities in case of insolvency. Many banks are rescued, but some end up 
insolvent or merge with other banks. Other reasons for banking crisis’ can be divided 
in microeconomic reasons, macroeconomic reasons and system-related reasons (Casu 
2006:446.) 
 
Microeconomic reasons for banking crisis come from inside of the bank. Poor banking 
practices, principal-agent problems, overstaffing and restrictive labor practices are a 
problem in some banks. Poor banking practices, such as risks in credits can be caused 
by poor corporate governance practices. Principal-agent problems are usually caused 
by loan officer compensations. Overstaffing and restrictive labor practices are usually 
problems in state owned banks (Casu 2006: 446.) 
 
Macroeconomic reasons for banking crises’ come from outside of the banks and more 
than one bank is usually suffering from the crisis. One example of the macroeconomic 
crisis is 1970’s oil crisis. System-related crisis are caused because of the changes in 
economical environment. These crisis are more common in developing countries. 
System-related crisis are cause by large state-ownerships, governments directions on 
banking activities, under-developed legal framework and under-developed stock 
markets (Casu 2006: 446.) 
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 3.4. Banks performance before, during, and after the financial crisis 2008-2009 
 
Capital structure affects corporations’ market value. Corporations are usually 
evaluated based on their leverage ratio. Highly leveraged corporations seem more 
risky than less leveraged corporations and thus these corporations are not expected to 
perform as good as less leveraged corporations. There are restrictions on the capital 
ratio of the banks. Banks tend to seek optimal leverage ratio that takes account the 
restrictions. Large amount of lending cause credit risks for bank. If credit risks are 
realized, banks’ might end up insolvent. Credit risks rises when economy is on crisis. 
During the financial crisis on 2008 banks all over the world had difficulties. Some 
banks survived the crisis period all though others went out of business or end up 
merging with other banks (Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga 2000). 
 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) research the capital structures impact on banks 
performance. Their hypothesis is that banks with different capital structures perform 
differently in financial markets. The study suggests that performance can affect 
economic growth. In the research the measures of performance are profitability and 
interest margins. Bank profitability is measured by dividing the profits by the total 
assets and interest margins are measured by dividing interest profits by the total assets. 
Banks profitability and interest margins are related to the performance, since these 
measures separate banks’ interest profits and interest costs. These variables impact on 
the costs of bank lending and via these impacts on investments of corporations. 
Investments affect the whole economy. The study suggests that banks’ capital ratio 
does not have any impact on banks profits and marginal (Demirguc-Kunt & Huizinga 
2000.) 
 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) study researches how banks’, which performed better during 
the financial crisis on 2008 differ from the banks’, which did not perform well during 
the crisis. The study investigates the banks before the financial crisis. Performance is 
measured as shareholder profits. The findings of the study suggest that the banks, 
which are less leveraged on year 2006 performed better during the financial crisis. 
Large banks that have total assets of over 50 billion dollars on year 2006, with larger 
amount of Tier 1 capital, deposits and which were less vulnerable to U.S. real estate 
market and less unstable finances, performed better during the crisis period (Beltratti 
& Stulz 2012.) 
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Beltratti and Stulz (2012) also suggest that the banks with shareholder friendly boards 
performed poorly during the financial crisis. The reason for this is, that these banks 
maximize the profits of the shareholders and thus they created more wealth before the 
crisis. The sub-prime loans might have an impact on this result, since the risks of the 
sub-prime loans were underestimated. In addition to amount of leverage and 
shareholder friendly boards the study research the impact of country restrictions in 
large banks. The study proposes that large banks in the countries with strict regulations 
performed better during the crisis period. Researchers note that strict regulation does 
not decrease the risks of banks. The cause of better performance is that banks in the 
more regulated countries practice more traditional ways of banking than the others, so 
the banks are not as vulnerable to crisis as new banking practices. Banks that have 
higher amount of equity are less risky. The countries with deposit insurance have 
higher risks in banking before the financial crisis than the ones without the deposit 
insurance (Beltratti 2012.) 
 
Berger and Bouwman (2009) study research banks’ capital structure before the crisis 
periods. The capital is compared to banks’ survival chances, competitive positions, 
profitability and share profits around the financial crisis. The study divides crisis 
periods on bank crisis and market crisis. Banking crisis comes inside the bank and 
market crisis comes outside of the bank. Study proposes, that small banks with higher 
amount of assets get through the bank crisis and market crisis. Medium and large sized 
banks benefit from higher amount of assets only during the bank crisis (Berger & 
Bouwman 2009.) 
 
Before the study of capital structure Berger and Bouwman (2008) studied the impact 
of financial crisis and liquidity creation of banks. They research the total amount of 
liquidity creation before financial crisis, during the financial crisis and after the crisis. 
Their study covers five major financial crisis in United States. The results show, that 
before all of the major crisis periods there has been significant changes in abnormal 
liquidity creations. Before the crisis there might be either too large or too small 
liquidity creation. Banks that increase their liquidity creation during the financial crisis 
periods usually get through the crisis better than the banks that decrease their liquidity 
creation (Berger & Bouwman 2008.) 
 
Vazquez and Federico (2015) analyze the development of bank capital funding 
structures and their impact on financial stability during 2001-2009. The study shows 
that banks with less structural liquidity and higher leverage before the crisis period are 
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more likely to fail after the crisis. In addition to the capital structure, the possibility of 
bank failure increases with risk-taking before the crisis. The smaller domestic banks 
are more exposed to liquidity risk although large global banks are more exposed to 
solvency risk as a result of enormous leverage. Researchers support the Basel III 
regulations, but they suggest paying attention on the latter (Vazques & Federico 2015.) 
 
Peni and Vähämaa (2011) study, whether good corporate governance impact on banks’ 
performance during the financial crisis. According to the study, banks with stronger 
corporate governance methods are significantly more profitable on 2008. In addition 
strong corporate governance methods have negative impact on banks’ stock market 
values during the financial crisis. Banks with better corporate governance have lower 
Tobins’ Q values and stock returns during the crisis. Empirical studies show that good 
corporate governance does not create value for the banks’ shareholders during the 
unstable markets (Peni & Vähänmaa 2011: 20-21.) Tobins’ Q measures the 
relationship between company’s total market value and total asset value (Korhonen & 
Vanhala 2007: 6.) The study of Peni & Vähämaa shows that banks with better 
corporate produce better earnings right after the financial crisis on year 2009 (Peni & 
Vähämaa 2011: 20-21). 
 
Aebi, Sabato and Schimd (2013) research the effect between risk management, good 
corporate governance and bank performance during the financial crisis. According to 
the study, the communication between risk managers and board positively impacts on 
performance of the banks. Banks where risk manager only communicate with the CEO 
perform significantly worse than other banks. The study shows that different interests 
between risk manager and CEO cause agency problems and CEO will not take advices 
from the risk manager. In this case, the risks of the bank will not become to knowledge 
of the company (Aebi, Sabato & Schimd 2012: 3213-3226). Unlike other studies, 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012: 1-17) and Fahlenbranch, Prilmeier and Stulz (2011: 11-26) 
have shown in theirs studies that good corporate governance and bank performance 
has no impact on each other. 
 
Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier and Stulz (2011) study, how getting through the financial crisis 
on 1998 impacts on performance during the financial crisis on 2008. In year 1998 
United States faced an enormous crisis, since Russia neglected its’ debt to United 
States. This caused investors and bankers to avoid risk. The study assumes that banks’ 
negative experiences make them change their operations. However, banks’ usually do 
not change their business models despite of the experiences of the crisis periods. 
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Former crisis’ in banks are a great predictors of what the next crisis will bring with it 
(Fahlenbranch 2011.) 
 
Banks’ profitability on 1998 explains the profitability during the financial crisis in 
2008. According to the study of Fahlenbrach et.al (2011), banks that did not perform 
during the crisis on 1998 do not perform during the crisis of 2008. Poor performance 
during the 1998 crisis predicts poor performance on the crisis of 2007-2008 and this 
causes the raise in insolvency risk in these banks. Poor profits on year 1998 are linked 
to 4,8 % increased risk to insolvency during the crisis on 2007-2008 (Fahlenbranch 
2011). 
 
Banks’ capital structure and performance can be measured by several different ways. 
The most known ones are leverage ratio, relative indebtedness, ROA and ROE. The 
measures help investors and regulators to evaluate banking activities. Banking industry 
is not a risk free and it has many possibilities of default. Along with financial crisis, 
banks might face banking crisis. For example bank run is the type of crisis, which can 
only occur in banking industry.  
 
Banks performance is studied with different points of view. Some researchers study 
the impact of capital and performance. There are many alternative results on this. 
Some studies propose that leverage affects performance: when the amount of leverage 
is high, the performance is poor. Some studies suggest, that capital structure does not 
affect profits. Also size effect and the level of corporate governance seem to have 
some impact on company performance as well as the performance in previous crisis.  
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4. METHODOLOGIES AND DATA 
 
This study uses yearly data from 2005 to 2014 to capture the impact of financial crisis 
in banking industry. Data is collected from Bankscope. The Bankscope database is 
used in numerous studies that discuss banking. For example Gropp and Heider (2010), 
Shehdaz and De Haan (2013) and Texeira, Silva, Fernandes and Alves (2014) use 
Bankscope in their researches about financial crisis and banks’ leverage. Fitch and 
other large rating agencies also use Bankscope as a database (Pasiouras, Gaganis and 
Zopunidis 2006). The data covers periods from before the financial crisis to after the 
financial crisis. Since the data is about Nordic banks, there are many small commercial 
banks in the dataset. The data used in this study excludes the smallest ones. It is more 
reliable to compare banks with similar amount of total assets and including small 
banks might affect the results of this study. The definition of a small bank is based on 
the total amount of assets in 2014. The study of Texeira et al (2014) uses banks with 
total assets of 1 billion USD. Same amount of total assets is used in this study as well.  
After omitting the smallest banks the data covers 189 Nordic banks. Data covers 45 
banks from Denmark, 23 from Finland, 68 from Norway and 53 from Sweden. The 
main research in this study is done with panel regression.  
 
  
   4.1. Data 
 
This study includes two different types of data from Bankscope. The capital ratio data 
includes Tier 1 ratio, total capital ratio (TCR), equity to total assets ratio (E/TA), 
equity to net loans ratio (E/NL), equity to liabilities ratio (E/L), cap funds to net loans 
ratio (CF/NL), capital funds to total asset ratio (C/T) and capital funds to liabilities 
ratio (CF/L). These ratios are used to measure banks’ capital ratio. Efficiency and 
profitability data includes: ROAE, recurring earning power (REP), net interest margin 
(NIM), net interest revenue to average assets (NIRA) and cost to income ratio (CTRI). 
All of the ratios are measured in all banks that the data covers. The ratios are used to 
define capital structure and performance in this study.  
 
   4.2. Methodologies 
 
This study uses panel regression model for analyzing the research problem. Panel 
regression model is used, because it allows to research dynamic relationships between 
variables. Using panel data also helps with controlling unobserved cross section 
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heterogeneity (Woolridge 2000: 191). Panel regression is used in numerous studies on 
capital structure and banking, For example Cheng et al (2012) and Texeira et al (2014) 
use panel regression to estimate their data over time. Empirical analysis in this study 
starts with summary statistics of the whole data and each Nordic country separately. 
Secondly the simple correlation, covariance analysis is done. The main research is 
done with panel regression analysis.  
 
The main study examines the relation between capital structure variables and 
performance variables. The regression analysis is done similarly to the study of 
Demiguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000). They use basic regression equation. This study 
uses regression formula to research whether capital structure affects performance or 
not.  
 
(9)                                             !"# = ∝  + !!!"# + !"# 
 
where i = 1….N and T= 1….T, X is dependent variable that represents capital 
structure variable, ! represents performance variable, U is the error variable and alpha 
and beta are constants. After main regressions this study runs Huber’s M method for 
the robustness check to ensure that the results are reliable and includes the outliers of 
the data. Following tables use abbreviations of variables. Table 3 shows the definitions 
of variables 
 
Table 3. Definitions of variables. 
Variables from CF/L to Tier 1 present capital structure and the variables from NIM to CTRI present 
performance variables. 
 
Variable Definition 
CF/L Capital funds to liabilities ratio 
C/T Capital funds to total asset ratio 
CF/NL Capital funds to net loans ratio 
E/L Equity to liabilities ratio 
E/NL Equity to net loans ratio 
E/TA Equity to total assets ratio 
TCR Total capital ratio 
Tier 1 Tier 1 ratio, 
NIM Net interest margin 
NIRA Net interest revenue to average assets 
REP Recurring earning power 
ROAE Return on equity 
CTRI Cost to income ratio 
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 4.3. Capital structure and performance over time 
 
This section examines the evolution of capital structure and performance during the 
study period. First this study views summaries from all countries together and then 
focuses on each country separately. Nordic countries vary from each other by their 
economic structure. By separating countries at this point, the differences in evolution 
of variables can be discovered.  
 
Table 4 summarizes the values of all variables used in this study. The table shows that 
values of variables vary significantly. Maximum values and minimum values have a 
large difference. Since most of the mean values are closer to minimum values it is 
obvious that the larger values are exceptional. The table contains all countries and all 
values from the banks, which are included in this study. Since there are some 
differences between banks and countries it is quite typical that the values vary from 
each other. The time period of this study includes financial crisis, which also explains 
the variety of values in each variable. Kurtosis and skewness of the data shows that the 
data is not symmetrically distributed. The large values of kurtosis’ indicates that the 
distribution of the data is peaked and variables have more similar than dissimilar 
values. It can be explained by the banking industry of these countries, since Nordic 
countries have a highly integrated banking system. 
 
 
Table 4. Summary statistics of all countries. 
Variables from Tier 1 to C/T present capital structure and the variables from ROAE to CTRI present 
performance variables. 
 
 Tier 1 TCR E/TA E/NL E/L CF/L CF/NL C/T ROAE REP NIM NIRA CTRI 
Mean 13,5 25,6 7,5 13,4 8,6 11 17,1 9,6 7,9 1,1 1,9 1,7 55,7 
Median 12,8 14,6 6,6 9,3 7,3 9,8 12,5 8,9 8,8 0,9 1,5 1,5 53,6 
Max 97,3 97,3 48,5 230,3 94,1 94,1 259,9 48,5 150,8 19,4 18,3 9,8 471,8 
Min 5,1 6,6 0,4 0,6 0,4 1,1 1,5 1,1 -166,3 -2,1 -0,0 -0,0 0,5 
Std. Dev 6,5 7,0 4,4 17,8 6,3 7,1 21,5 4,9 14,3 1,1 1,5 1,3 34,5 
Skewness 4,8 4,9 2,6 7,1 5,1 3,9 7,1 1,8 -3,2 5,9 3,2 2,2 6,4 
Kurtosis 46,6 41,6 18,0 68,1 54,3 35,9 68,2 11,2 53,8 85,9 25,3 10,6 72,7 
              
Obs. 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 824 
table 3 defines all abbreviations used in this table 
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Banks as well as companies capital structure and performance variables vary over 
time. Financial crisis of 2007-2009 left remarkable mark in various number of 
companies. Next four tables examine how much financial crisis affected banks from 
different countries. Tables show the mean values of chosen bank variables in different 
years. It is expected that the values of some variables drop during the financial crisis. 
 
Table 5 shows yearly variables of all banks included in this study. As expected, all 
values of variables drop when the crisis period started. One exception is cost to income 
ratio (CTRI), which value dropped right after the crisis on 2009 and 2010. Values of 
Tier 1 capital and total capital ratio (TCR) rebound shortly after the crisis started and 
the values raise yearly from 2008. TCR and Tier 1 values pass their 2005 values on 
year 2009.  
 
 
Table 5. Yearly variables of all banks. 
Variables from Tier 1 to C/T present capital structure and the variables from ROAE to CTRI present 
performance variables. 
 
Year Tier 1 TCR E/TA E/NL E/L CF/L CF/NL C/T ROAE REP NIM NIRA CTRI 
2005 13,14 14,38 12,29 28,78 13,02 14,00 33,06 13,71 14,98 2,20 2,55 2,29 52,61 
2006 13,16 14,81 12,01 22,40 18,66 15,36 25,68 11,95 13,46 1,92 2,36 2,08 52,37 
2007 10,90 12,57 11,75 19,59 15,42 12,91 22,02 10,49 11,25 1,51 2,18 1,85 55,75 
2008 12,02 13,73 11,12 20,43 15,09 11,34 20,51 9,52 2,82 0,79 2,20 1,82 66,55 
2009 15,08 16,87 10,83 20,86 13,85 12,25 15,95 11,18 4,62 1,65 2,09 1,82 54,43 
2010 15,97 18,03 11,32 30,28 14,60 12,18 18,15 10,12 6,94 1,53 1,97 1,69 53,42 
2011 16,88 18,28 11,51 29,36 16,52 10,91 27,19 9,51 6,64 1,18 2,07 1,76 59,90 
2012 16,74 18,28 10,98 28,75 20,98 10,74 23,38 9,48 7,45 1,24 2,25 1,91 55,78 
2013 18,31 19,91 11,42 27,84 16,96 11,44 23,95 10,05 10,88 1,46 2,29 2,03 50,74 
2014 20,16 21,66 11,49 30,97 16,54 11,39 24,65 10,03 12,00 1,47 2,39 2,12 48,05 
table 3 defines all abbreviations used in this table 
 
Most of the variables have not rebounded on their before the crisis values in year 
2014. The table shows that all of the performance variables still suffer from the 
financial crisis on 2014. The most significant drops can be seen in cost to income ratio 
(CTRI), recurring earning power (REP) and ROAE values. The largest drop in 
performance value is 33 % of the 2005 value in ROAE.  
 
Four of the capital structure variables have passed their 2005 values. Tier 1 capital, 
total capital ratio (TCR), equity to net liabilities (E/NL) and equity to liabilities (E/L) 
values have improved from 2005 values. The improvement is between 7 % and 34 %. 
On the other hand, values of equity to total assets (E/TA), capital funds to liabilities 
39	
(CF/L), capital fund to net loans (CF/NL) and capital funds to total assets (C/T) ratios 
have not recovered from the financial crisis. The decrease of these variables is 
between 6 % and 27 %.  Financial crisis has a negative impact on capital structure and 
performance variables, but some of the capital structure variables have improved after 
the crisis period and others still remain lower. Crisis impact on all performance 
variables and none of them has recovered to same level as they were before the crisis.  
 
Tables 6 to 9 this study focuses on each country separately to research if there is any 
differences between them. Table 6 examines data from banks in Denmark. 45 of the 
banks in this study are from Denmark. The start of the crisis in 2007 has not affected 
all of the variables immediately. As in previous table 4, the value of cost to income 
ratio has even raised during the financial crisis. The values of cost to income ratio 
(CTRI) have not been affected by the crisis and it grows higher than the value on 2005 
during the crisis period. Cost to income ratio (CTRI) remains higher than on before 
crisis period though the whole study period.  
 
 
Table 6. Yearly variables Danish banks.  
Variables from Tier 1 to C/T present capital structure and the variables from ROAE to CTRI present 
performance variables. 
 
Year Tier 1 TCR E/TA E/NL E/L CF/L CF/NL C/T ROAE REP NIM NIRA CTRI 
2005 13,50 14,54 13,21 17,69 12,48 14,12 19,31 15,36 12,31 1,42 2,08 1,96 46,62 
2006 13,02 14,28 13,55 18,96 31,07 17,44 23,13 13,53 13,66 1,62 2,17 2,04 47,93 
2007 11,76 13,42 12,08 15,24 23,82 14,20 19,15 11,92 10,31 1,06 2,06 1,93 54,21 
2008 13,58 15,67 11,09 13,62 16,81 11,88 16,13 10,33 -0,35 0,10 2,14 2,00 75,16 
2009 15,12 17,35 11,62 17,26 17,41 15,24 20,87 12,51 -6,86 1,47 2,36 2,19 55,09 
2010 16,38 18,80 11,95 34,73 17,20 17,13 28,87 13,26 0,85 1,38 2,26 2,08 56,33 
2011 19,64 21,68 12,91 33,42 24,27 13,62 28,04 11,74 -1,94 0,61 2,29 2,07 78,74 
2012 17,12 18,50 11,33 24,51 19,93 13,44 30,78 11,63 -0,23 1,25 2,42 2,16 57,31 
2013 17,76 18,48 12,49 30,11 29,66 13,08 28,68 11,37 -0,30 1,29 2,48 2,21 57,66 
2014 18,05 18,79 13,08 33,47 28,85 12,70 31,44 11,08 4,65 1,17 2,55 2,27 56,94 
table 3 defines all abbreviations used in this table 
 
Banks in Denmark seem to recover fast from the financial crisis. Only few variables 
are below the level of 2005 in year 2009. ROAE, capital funds to total assets (C/T) and 
equity to total assets values are the only ones that have not reached the 2005 level on 
year 2009. Unlike the mean of all countries, only two of the performance variables do 
not reach the 2005 values in 2014. The largest drop is in ROAE, which value on 2014 
is 62 % less than in 2005. Recurring earning power (REP) has dropped 17 % of its 
2005 value. Other performance values have increased from 2005. The largest increase 
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is in cost to income ratio (CTRI), is 18 %. The mean of all countries showed that cost 
to income ratio dropped from year 2005 and has not reached the level in 2014.  
 
Three of the capital structure values have not reached the 2005 level in 2014. Equity to 
total assets (E/TA), capital funds to liabilities (CF/L) and capital funds to total assets 
(C/T). This result is similar to means of all countries. Although, capital funds to net 
loans (CF/NL) is significantly higher in Denmark than in all countries together. The 
raise of the variable is 38 % during the study period. Since Denmark has only 45 banks 
out of 189 in this study, the results can vary significantly from the mean of all 
countries. 
 
Table 7 represents the yearly variables of Finnish banks during the study period. 
Finland has the smallest amount of banks in the data. The minimum amount of total 
assets is 1 billion in this study and Finland has only 23 banks that reach that value. 
Only three variables dropped at the beginning of the crisis period. Values of equity to 
net liabilities (E/NL), capital funds to net loans (CF/NL) and cost to income ratio 
(CTRI). The largest drop on 2007 is 30 % in capital funds to net liabilities ratio 
(CF/NL). Most of the variables have even improved from 2005 in year 2007, which 
implicates that the crisis did not hit Finland as fast as it did to other Nordic countries. 
In year 2008 almost all of capital structure values sunk below the before crisis values. 
On the other hand, only ROAE value dropped on 2008, while all the other 
performance variables grew from 2007.  
 
 
Table 7. Yearly variables Finnish banks. 
Variables from Tier 1 to C/T present capital structure and the variables from ROAE to CTRI present 
performance variables. 
 
Year Tier 1 TCR E/TA E/NL E/L CF/L CF/NL C/T ROAE REP NIM NIRA CTRI 
2005 12,10 14,12 8,46 27,59 9,43 11,43 21,46 10,21 13,52 1,11 1,30 1,21 58,05 
2006 12,05 15,06 9,05 20,48 10,76 12,99 18,18 10,80 10,90 1,35 1,34 1,23 50,76 
2007 12,13 15,28 10,02 19,97 12,62 12,62 16,26 10,47 17,36 1,69 1,86 1,77 46,72 
2008 10,68 13,32 7,99 12,36 9,81 12,63 13,93 10,30 7,01 2,03 1,95 1,83 52,67 
2009 11,95 14,62 8,38 13,76 10,16 12,88 14,65 10,60 9,97 2,42 1,74 1,65 53,16 
2010 12,55 14,69 8,45 16,72 10,31 12,60 13,35 10,22 8,58 2,13 1,18 1,12 49,50 
2011 13,23 14,87 8,04 12,83 9,76 12,05 12,58 9,79 7,43 1,69 1,03 1,00 53,62 
2012 14,38 16,61 6,86 12,47 7,71 9,28 13,44 8,18 8,31 0,83 1,06 1,01 56,03 
2013 21,12 22,70 7,65 15,72 8,60 10,29 16,37 9,10 8,23 0,84 1,06 1,01 57,25 
2014 24,71 25,52 7,21 18,20 8,00 10,02 14,95 8,93 8,37 0,87 1,08 1,03 49,50 
table 3 defines all abbreviations used in this table 
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The table shows that despite the slow reaction to the crisis, all of the performance 
values are below the 2005 value on 2014. Unlike table 4, Finland has only 2 variables, 
which values have increased after 2005. Tier 1 capital and total capital ratio (TCR) are 
the only ones that have recovered after the crisis period. Reason for this might be the 
strict regulation of the capital structures of banks. Since Basel committee and the 
European Central Bank have tighten the regulation of capital structure there might be a 
reason for these variables to grow. Tier 1 capital and total capital ratio (TCR) values 
have rose in all countries in this study, and all of them follow the Basel regulations. 
Table 7 shows that banks in Finland have not fully recovered from the financial crisis. 
Since the values have not rebounded back to their before the crisis levels. 
 
Table 8 represents the Norwegian banks. There are 68 banks from Norway in this 
study, which is the largest amount compared to other countries. Norway is slightly 
different country from the other Nordic countries, since it is the only one that does not 
belong to the European Union. Unlike Finland, almost all of the variables of 
Norwegian banks dropped in year 2007, cost to income ratio (CTRI) is exceptional, 
since its value grew 9 % on year 2007 compared to year 2005. This explains why the 
mean of all countries shows that cost to income ratio grew on 2007.  
 
 
Table 8. Yearly variables Norwegian banks.   
Variables from Tier 1 to C/T present capital structure and the variables from ROAE to CTRI present 
performance variables. 
 
Year Tier 1 TCR E/TA E/NL E/L CF/L CF/NL C/T ROAE REP NIM NIRA CTRI 
2005 11,19 13,20 12,80 16,65 12,74 14,97 20,17 15,10 15,81 3,20 2,94 2,76 58,28 
2006 14,77 15,59 12,06 15,67 12,40 13,16 14,71 10,45 13,80 2,32 2,23 2,14 58,92 
2007 10,35 12,07 12,02 11,71 8,99 8,91 11,88 8,11 11,90 1,61 1,55 1,50 64,01 
2008 11,19 12,88 13,47 18,67 17,91 8,99 12,05 8,17 5,52 0,60 1,67 1,60 66,74 
2009 15,65 17,40 11,59 23,02 13,03 10,06 13,49 11,54 9,32 1,70 1,52 1,45 51,88 
2010 12,96 14,79 11,53 34,16 11,61 9,96 12,75 8,95 10,10 1,61 1,48 1,41 50,67 
2011 12,82 14,36 11,47 30,52 11,36 10,01 38,29 8,99 9,27 1,38 1,44 1,37 53,55 
2012 13,59 14,63 11,36 35,66 25,98 10,45 26,95 9,37 8,51 1,20 1,64 1,54 54,23 
2013 15,31 16,60 12,17 37,67 12,58 12,05 28,67 10,65 12,01 1,71 1,78 1,72 43,15 
2014 15,67 17,30 12,48 42,40 13,68 12,06 28,33 10,64 12,16 1,78 1,93 1,88 40,01 
table 3 defines all abbreviations used in this table 
 
In year 2008 and 2009 three of the capital structure variables start to recover from their 
crisis values. Tier 1 capital, total capital ratio (TCR) and equity to net liabilities 
(E/NL) values are even higher in 2009 than in 2005. On the year 2014, only three of 
the capital structure variables remain lower than the before crisis period. Equity to 
total assets (E/TA), capital funds to liabilities (CF/L) and capital fund to total assets 
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(C/T) do not rebound back to before crisis level. The drop of these variables is 
between 2 % to 29 %. The highest improvement in capital structure variables is in 
equity to net liabilities (E/NL), that is up to 61 %.  
 
All of the performance variables have decreased from before crisis values. Cost to 
income ratio (CTRI), which increased when the crisis period started on 2007 has the 
lowest decrease of all performance variables. Cost to income ratio (CTRI) decreased 7 
%, as other performance variables decreased between 44 % and 62 % of their 2005 
values. Even thought the values of variables have not reached before crisis values, 
table 7 shows that the banks in Norway are recovering. Only cost to income ratio 
(CTRI) value is less on 2014 than on 2009, when the financial crisis period officially 
ended.  
 
Table 9 focuses on Swedish banks. There are 53 banks from Sweden that are included 
in this study. In year 2007 most of the variables dropped significantly. There are three 
exceptions on this. Equity to liabilities (E/L), capital funds to liabilities (CF/L) and 
capital fund to total assets (C/T) have increased from their 2005 values. These values 
are affected by financial crisis on year 2009 while Tier 1 capital and total capital ratio 
(TCR) values rebound pass their 2005 values. All of the capital structure variables are 
affected by financial crisis on year 2007-2009, but not all are affected at the same year. 
The largest drop of all capital structure variables is in capital fund to net loans 
(CF/NL), which lost 82 % of its value on year 2009 compared to year 2005. Other 
variables are affected by the crisis, but the drop in them is less aggressive than in 
CF/NL.  
 
 
Table 9. Yearly variables Swedish banks. 
Variables from Tier 1 to C/T present capital structure and the variables from ROAE to CTRI present 
performance variables. 	
Year Tier 1 TCR E/TA E/NL E/L CF/L CF/NL C/T ROAE REP NIM NIRA CTRI 
2005 14,80 15,42 11,87 55,72 15,09 13,43 70,21 10,70 17,74 2,42 3,11 2,58 51,51 
2006 11,87 14,42 11,32 34,17 15,05 16,45 43,64 12,35 13,75 2,00 3,05 2,37 49,99 
2007 9,68 10,76 11,82 34,27 16,29 17,39 43,50 12,32 8,59 1,76 3,29 2,31 50,09 
2008 12,23 12,98 9,13 33,91 11,76 14,07 49,63 10,28 -0,08 1,23 3,24 1,97 65,22 
2009 15,54 16,03 9,73 24,74 12,68 10,34 12,48 8,45 7,82 1,39 2,93 2,12 58,93 
2010 23,44 25,54 11,54 25,00 18,41 8,17 13,59 7,28 7,63 1,30 2,80 2,01 56,72 
2011 23,09 23,38 11,56 30,18 19,12 7,97 14,79 7,12 11,17 1,25 3,26 2,34 53,29 
2012 24,44 26,57 11,79 29,29 20,11 8,94 14,70 7,92 12,70 1,46 3,48 2,54 57,22 
2013 22,47 25,16 11,05 17,05 15,63 9,15 14,52 8,03 20,34 1,53 3,40 2,62 53,73 
2014 26,65 28,50 10,29 17,01 12,86 9,56 15,87 8,42 19,86 1,51 3,44 2,55 52,02 
table 3 defines all abbreviations used in this table 
43	
 
Only two of capital structure variables are recovered from the financial crisis. Tier 1 
capital and total capital ratio (TCR) have both passed their before the crisis level. Both 
of the variables have rise over 40 % compared to before the crisis level. Restrictions 
on capital structure levels of banks might explain this reaction, since other capital 
structure variables remain below the 2005 values.  
 
Performance variables of Swedish banks decreased when the financial crisis started. 
Net interest margin (NIM) increased in year 2007, but the value of it dropped on year 
2009. Cost to income ratio (CTRI) suffered from only one drop on year 2007 and after 
that the value of variable begun to rise. On year 2014 three of the performance 
variables passed their 2005 values. ROAE and net interest margin (NIM) have both 
improved nearly 10 % from 2005. Cost to income ratio (CTRI) improved less than 
NIM and ROAE, only 1 % from its 2005 value. Over all Swedish banks seem to 
recovered quite well from the crisis compared to Finnish and Norwegian banks. 
 
Tables 4 – 9 examine yearly data from all the Nordic countries together and separately. 
The capital structure and performance variables seem to react similarly on financial 
crisis. Finland did not react to financial crisis as fast as the other countries, but Finnish 
banks suffered from financial crisis as much as the other Nordic banks.  
 
Table 10 examines correlation and t-statistics of the whole data. Table shows that all 
of the capital structure variables highly correlate with each other on 1 % significance 
level. Unlike capital structure variables, all of the performance variables do not 
correlate with each other. Table shows that recurring earning power (REP) is the only 
variable, which correlates with all of the other performance variables with 1 % 
significance level.  
 
Net interest revenue to average assets (NIRA) and net interest margin (NIM) have 
almost no correlation with ROAE, the correlation with these variables is less than 4 %. 
On the other hand, NIM and NIRA highly correlate with each other. The correlation 
with these variables is 97 %, which means that the variables move to same direction 
almost all of the times. Cost to income ratio (CTRI) has less correlation with NIRA 
and NIM than other variables, the variables correlate 8 % to 9 %, with significance 
levels of 10 % and 5 %. Cost to income ratio (CTRI) has high negative correlation 
with ROAE and recurring earning power (REP). The negative correlation between 
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these variables is in between 24 % and 40 %. These variables are likely to move a bit 
opposite directions at different periods.  
 
The reason for the difference in correlations between capital structure variables and 
performance variables might be caused because all of the capital structure variables 
measure capital structure. Performance variables do measure performance, but each 
variable measures it from different angle. Performance variables measure earning 
power and income ratios as well as net interests in assets. It is not surprise that the 
performance variables might not correlate highly with each other, since the variables 
measure slightly different things.  
 
Table 10 shows that some of the capital structure variables do not correlate with 
performance variables. Total capital ratio (TCR) has almost no correlation with 
performance variables, the highest correlation is 6 % with net interest margin (NIM). 
Tier 1 variable has the highest correlation with net interest margin (NIM) with 11 % 
and net interest revenue to average assets (NIRA) with 9,6 %. Correlation with net 
interest margin (NIM) is statistically significant on 5 % level and correlation with net 
interest revenue to average assets (NIRA) is statistical significant on 10 % level.  
 
Equity to net liabilities (E/NL) correlates significantly with all the other performance 
variables, except ROAE, which correlates with only -4 %. Other variables correlate in 
between 15 % to 20 % with 1 % significance level. Equity to liabilities (E/L) 
correlates with all performance variables. ROAE correlates less than other 
performance variables -11 % with 10 % significance level. All the other performance 
variables correlate more with E/L and the results are statistically significant on 1 % 
level. Capital funds to net loans (CF/NL) correlates with all of the performance 
variables between 7 % and 18,59 %. The highest correlation is with net interest margin 
(NIM) and the lowest is with ROAE. ROAE is the only performance variable, which 
correlation is significant on 5 % level. Correlation with   other performance variables 
is statistically significant on 1 % level.  
 
Equity to total assets (E/TA) correlates with all of the performance variables. The 
correlation with cost to income ratio (CTRI) is the lowest one with 8,3 % with 
statistical significance level of 10 %. Other variables correlate with equity to total 
assets in between 9 % to 47 % with significance level of 1 %. Capital funds to total 
assets (C/T) correlates with all of performance variables with 1 % significance level. 
The correlation is in between 16 % and 46 %.  ROAE correlates less with capital funds 
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to total assets with 16 %. Capital funds to liabilities (CF/L) correlates with all of the 
performance variables with significance level of 1 %. The correlation between 
variables is in between 19 % and 40 %.  
 
Tables 4 – 10 examine the capital structure and performance variables of the whole 
data as well as the countries independently. The variables seem to have a small 
difference in each country. All of the countries in this study have been affected during 
and after the financial crisis, but the reaction times differ from country to country. 
Some of the countries still suffer from the crisis but it is noticeable that some of the 
capital structure variables have improved in all of them. There is a correlation between 
capital structure variables and performance variables. Table 10 covers the whole data 
and time periods with simple correlations. The next section will focus on the 
hypothesis’s of the study and research more on banks capital structure impact on bank 
performance.
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Table 10. Correlation of variables 
Variables CF/L, CF/NL, C/T, E/NL, E/L, E/TA, TCR and Tier 1 represent capital structure. Variables CTRI, NIM, NIRA, ROAE and REP represent 
performance. 
 
 
Corr 
             t-Statistic CF/L CF/NL C/T CTRI E/NL E/L E/TA NIM NIRA TCR ROAE Tier 1 REP 
CF/L 1,000 
              .... 
              
             CF/NL 0,411*** 1,000 
             12,949  .... 
             
             C/T 0,980*** 0,434*** 1,000 
            142,533 13,830  .... 
            
             CTRI 0,146*** 0,183*** 0,164*** 1,000 
           4,245 5,347 4,782  .... 
           
             E/NL 0,412*** 0,988*** 0,428*** 0,153*** 1,000 
          12,971 186,811 13,615 4,452  .... 
          
             E/TA 0,939*** 0,387*** 0,901*** 0,083* 0,434*** 1,000 
         78,586 12,069 59,623 2,406 13,820  .... 
         
             E/L 0,917*** 0,413*** 0,917*** 0,088* 0,461*** 0,978*** 1,000 
        66,243 13,010 66,296 2,548 14,929 137,291  .... 
        
             NIM 0,377*** 0,185*** 0,438*** 0,098** 0,200*** 0,378*** 0,447*** 1,000 
       11,703 5,427 13,977 2,846 5,856 11,740 14,354   .... 
       
             NIRA 0,404*** 0,165*** 0,468*** 0,082* 0,181*** 0,404*** 0,477*** 0,976*** 1,000 
      12,664 4,819 15,205 2,369 5,280 12,684 15,592 131,045   .... 
      
             TCR 0,373*** 0,135*** 0,298*** -0,033 0,160*** 0,429*** 0,360*** 0,060 0,045 1,000 
     11,559 3,918 8,967 -0,096 4,668 13,654 11,094 1,733 1,300  .... 
     
             ROAE -0,195*** -0,079* -0,189*** -0,403*** -0,043 -0,111** -0,094** 0,010 0,021 -0,031 1,000 
    -5,718 -2,287 -5,533 -12,640 -1,245  3,216 -2,732 0,297 0,627 -0,903  .... 
    
             Tier 1 0,428*** 0,153*** 0,354*** -0,037 0,198*** 0,520*** 0,460*** 0,112** 0,096* 0,945*** -0,024 1,000 
   13,602 4,442 10,852 -1,076 5,792 17,492 14,870 3,250 2,768 83,163 -0,069  .... 
   
             REP 0,333*** 0,162*** 0,382*** -0,248*** 0,185*** 0,352*** 0,414*** 0,578*** 0,619*** 0,034 0,437*** 0,068 1,000 
  10,142 4,731 11,865 -7,367 5,416 10,809 13,042 20,335 22,615 0,982 13,953 1,966  .... 
 
* denotes 10 % significance level, ** denotes 5 % significance level, *** denotes 1 % significance level 
table 3 defines all abbreviations used in this table 
	 47	 		
             4.4. Regression analysis 
 
This part of the study is the main part. It examines all of the hypothesis’s. The main 
research is done with panel regression analysis. Table 10 will examine H1: Banks’ 
capital structure before the financial crisis of 2007-2008 impacts on banks 
performance during the crisis period. Capital structure is measured on years 2005-
2006 and performance is measured on years 2007-2008. The hypothesis is tested 
similarly to Demiguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) research.  
 
(10)  !"!""#!!""# = ∝  + !!!"!""#!!""# + !"# 
 
where i = 1….N and X is independent variable that represents capital structure 
variable, ! is dependent variable that represents performance, U is the error variable 
and alpha and beta are constants. 
 
Table 11 shows that the coefficient is significant with only ROAE and cost to income 
ratio (CTRI). Cost to income ratio (CTRI) is significant on 10 % level and ROAE is 
significant on 1 % level. Net interest margin (NIM), net interest revenue to average 
assets (NIRA) and recurring earning power (REP) are not impacted by the coefficient. 
Capital funds to liabilities (CF/L) has significant impact on net interest margin (NIM), 
net interest revenue on average assets (NIRA) and cost to income ratio (CTRI). The 
impact on net interest margin (NIM) and net interest revenue on average assets 
(NIRA) is significant on 10 % level. The impact on cost to income ratio (CTRI) is 
significant on 5 % level. Capital funds to liabilities (CF/L) does not have significant 
impact on recurring earning power (REP) and ROAE during the crisis period.  
 
Capital funds to total assets (C/T) impacts on net interest margin (NIM), ROAE and 
cost to income ratio (CTRI). The impact on net interest margin (NIM) and ROAE is 
significant on 10 % level and the impact on cost to income ratio (CTRI) is significant 
on 5 % level. Net interest revenue on average assets (NIRA) and recurring earning 
power (REP) are not impacted by capital funds to total assets (C/T).  
 
Capital funds to net loans (CF/NL) has an impact on only recurring earning power 
(REP). The impact is significant on 10 % level. Other performance variables are not 
impacted by capital funds to net loans (CF/NL). Equity to liabilities (E/L) has on 
impact on four of the performance variables. This variable has the highest impact on 
net interest margin (NIM) on 1 % significance level. Net interest revenue on average 
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assets (NIRA) and cost to income ratio (CTRI) are impacted by equity to liabilities 
(E/L) on 5 % significance level. Equity to liabilities (E/L) has lowest significant 
impact on ROAE on 10 % significance level. Recurring earning power (REP) is not 
significantly impacted by equity to liabilities (E/L).  
 
Equity to net liabilities (E/NL) impacts only on recurring earning power (REP). The 
impact is significant on 10 % significance level. Equity to total assets (E/TA) has 
highest impact on net interest margin (NIM). The impact is significant on 1 % level. 
Equity to total assets (E/TA) has also an impact on net interest revenue on average 
assets (NIRA), ROAE and cost to income ratio (CTRI). The impact on these variables 
is significant on 5 % level.  
 
Total capital ratio (TCR) has not impact on any of the performance variables. Tier 1 
has an impact on only net interest margin (NIM) and net interest revenue on average 
assets (NIRA). The impact on net interest margin (NIM) is significant on 1 % level 
and the impact on net interest revenue on average assets (NIRA) is significant on 5 % 
level. 
 
The level of capital structure before the crisis has highest significant impact on net 
interest margin (NIM) and cost to income ratio (CTRI). Capital structure variables 
have least impacted recurring earning power (REP). Net interest revenue on average 
assets (NIRA) and ROAE are impacted by the capital structure in most of the cases. 
Total capital ratio (TCR) has no significant impact on any of the performance 
variables. Table 11 shows that bank’s capital structure before the crisis affect bank 
performance during the crisis period 2007-2008 in most of the cases. H1 is accepted. 
 
Table 12 examines H2. H2 states that banks’ capital structure during the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008 impacts on banks performance after the crisis period. Tables 4 – 9 
show that the capital structure variables have decreased in value during the time period 
of financial crisis. This hypothesis researches the low periods effect on performance 
after the crisis period.  
 
(11)  !"!""#!!"#$ = ∝  + !!!"!""#!!""# + !"# 
 
where i = 1….N and X is independent variable that represents capital structure 
variable, ! is dependent variable that represents performance variable, U is the error 
variable and alpha and beta are constants. 
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Table 11. Banks’ capital structure before the financial crisis and performance during 
financial crisis 2007-2008. Capital structures’ impact on performance.  
 
Variab. NIM NIRA REP ROAE CTRI 
C -0,69 -0,36 0,04 12,57*** 22,09* 
t-stat -1,56 -1,16 0,16 3,6 1,87 
 
CF/L 1,84* 1,14* 0,08 -11,04 -53,69** 
t-stat 2,08 1,86 0,16 -1,59 -2,29 
C/T -1,92* -1,07 0,19 15,05* 61,21** 
t-stat -1,81 -1,45 0,32 1,81 2,18 
CF/NL -0,04 -0,09 -0,13* -1,22 3,83 
t-stat -0,34 -1,15 -2,04 -1,36 1,28 
E/L -2,35*** -1,54** -0,24 11,47* 51,27** 
t-stat -2,72 -2,55 -0,48 1,69 2,24 
E/NL -0,02 0,05 0,15* 1,60 -4,11 
t-stat -0,16 0,52 1,85 1,44 -1,11 
E/TA 2,71*** 1,73** 0,09 -16,03** -56,79** 
t-stat 2,63 2,41 0,15 -1,97 -2,07 
TCR 
 
-0,02 -0,01 -0,03 -0,53 0,15 
t-stat -0,40 -0,34 -0,82 -1,25 -011 
Tier1 
 
0,17*** 0,09** 0,02 0,24 0,73 
t-stat 2,93 2,29 0,60 0,53 0,49 
Obs 
 
-0,34 258 258 258 255 
Periods 4 4 4 4 4 
* denotes 10 % significance level, ** denotes 5 % significance level, *** denotes 1 % significance level. Notice that observations 
between variables vary. Some of the variables were not established with all of the banks in this study. 
table 3 defines all abbreviations used in this table 
 
Table 12 shows that coefficient is not impacted by all of the capital structure variables. 
Net interest margin (NIM), net interest revenue on average assets (NIRA) and 
recurring earning (REP) are not impacted by the coefficient. ROAE and cost to income 
ratio (CTRI) are impacted by coefficient on 1 % significance level. Capital funds to 
liabilities (CF/L) has an impact on only ROAE on 1 % significance level. Other 
performance variables are not significantly impacted by capital funds to liabilities 
(CF/L).  
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Capital funds to total assets (C/T) has a significant impact on only ROAE. The impact 
on ROAE is significant on 1 % level. Other performance variables are not significantly 
impacted by capital funds to total assets (C/T). Capital funds to net loans (CF/NL) has 
highest impact on ROAE. The impact is negative and significant on 1 % level. Capital 
funds to net loans (CF/NL) has significant impact also on cost to income ratio (CTRI). 
The impact is significant on 5 % level. Other performance variables are not 
significantly impacted by capital funds to net loans (CF/NL).  
 
Equity to liabilities (E/L) has significant impact on all of the performance variables 
except cost to income ratio (CTRI). Net interest margin (NIM), net interest revenue on 
average assets (NIRA), recurring earning power (REP) and ROAE are impacted by 
equity to liabilities (E/L) on 1 % significance level. Equity to net liabilities (E/NL) has 
a significant impact on ROAE and cost to income ratio (CTRI). The impact on ROAE 
is significant on 1 % level and the impact on cost to income ratio (CTRI) is significant 
on 5 % level.  
 
Equity to total assets (E/TA) has significant impact on net interest revenue on average 
assets (NIRA), recurring earning power (REP) and ROAE. The significance level of 
these impacts is 1 %. Cost to income ratio (CTRI) and net interest margin (NIM) are 
not significantly impacted by equity to total assets (E/TA).   
 
Total capital ratio (TCR) has a significant impact on all of the variables except cost to 
income ratio (CTRI). The highest impact total capital ratio (TCR) has on ROAE on 1 
% significance level. Net interest revenue on average assets (NIRA) is impacted on 5 
% significance level. Net interest margin (NIM) and recurring earning power (REP) 
are both impacted on 10 % significance level. Tier 1 has and impact on all of the 
performance variables except cost to income ratio (CTRI). The impact on net interest 
margin (NIM), net interest revenue on average assets (NIRA), recurring earning power 
(REP) and ROAE is significant on 1 % level.  
 
In table 11 total capital ratio (TCR) did not affect performance variables. The results 
on table 12 show that all of the capital structure variables affect on all of the 
performance variables. Bank’s capital structure during the financial crisis affect bank 
performance after the financial crisis. H2 is accepted. 
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Table 12. Banks’ capital structure during the financial crisis and performance after the 
crisis. Capital structures’ impact on performance. 
 
Variab. NIM NIRA REP ROAE CTRI 
C -0,22 -0,15 -0,13 7,12*** 43,86*** 
t-stat -1,37 -1,03 -0,69 3,25 8,17 
 
CF/L 0,14 0,14 0,11 6,02*** -8,84 
t-stat 1,45 1,55 1,00 -5,85 -1,05 
C/T -0,1 -0,1 -0,12 -7,71*** 12 
t-stat -0,86 -0,93 -0,85 -4,75 1,14 
CF/NL 0,01 0,00 -0,01 -0,98*** 2** 
t-stat 0,23 0,04 -0,38 -2,78 2,3 
E/L -0,75*** -0,71*** -0,61*** -12,95*** 5,54 
t-stat -4,58 -4,64 -3,2 -5,85 0,49 
E/NL -0,01 -0,01 0,01 1.20*** -2,18** 
t-stat -0,33 -0,23 0,31 12,77 -2,04 
E/TA 1,11 1,03*** 0,90*** 15,95*** -6,72 
t-stat 5,39 5,43 3,78 5,78 -0,48 
TCR 
 
0,04* 0,04** 0,04* 0,73*** -0,03 
t-stat 1,8 1,97 1,84 2,71 -0,05 
Tier1 
 
-0,06*** -0,06*** -0,07*** -0,88*** -0,06 
t-stat -2,46 -2,63 -2,7 
 
-2,80 -0,72 
Obs 
 
717 717 717 717 708 
Periods 8 8 8 8 8 
* denotes 10 % significance level, ** denotes 5 % significance level, *** denotes 1 % significance level. Notice that observations 
between variables vary. Some of the variables were not established with all of the banks in this study.  
table 3 defines all abbreviations used in this table 
 
 
Table 13 examines H3. H3 states that banks’ capital structure affect bank performance 
over time. This is the last hypothesis of this study. Table shows that only ROAE and 
cost to income ratio (CTRI) are affected significantly by the coefficient. Both are 
impacted by 1 % significance level. Net interest margin (NIM), net interest revenue on 
average assets (NIRA) and recurring earning power (REP) are not impacted by the 
coefficient.  
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Capital funds to liabilities (CF/L) affects significantly on recurring earning power 
(REP) and cost to income ratio (CTRI). The impact on recurring earning power (REP) 
is significant on 5 % level and the impact on cost to income ratio (CTRI) is significant 
on 1 % level. Both of the variables are affected negatively by the capital structure 
variable. Other performance variables are not significantly impacted by capital funds 
to liabilities (CF/L). 
 
 
Table 13. Banks’ capital structure and bank performance over the whole study period. 
Capital structures’ impact on performance. 
 
Variab. NIM NIRA REP ROAE CTRI 
C -0,09 -0,03 0,05 12,59*** 43,41*** 
t-stat -0,57 -0,18 0,28 6,51 9,28 
CF/L -0,09 -0,09 -0,17** -0,26 -15,35*** 
t-stat -1,17 -1,5 -2,42 -0,31 -2,97 
C/T 0,16 0,17* 0,22** -0,36 20*** 
t-stat 1,58 1,95 2,24 -0,3 3 
CF/NL 0,01 0,00 -0,01 -0,88*** 1,88** 
t-stat 0,38 0,19 -0,37 -2,58 2,33 
E/L -0,25*** -0,21*** -0,03 -0,41 16,09*** 
t-stat -2,7 -2,71 -0,36 -0,38 2,97 
E/NL -0,02 -0,01 0,01 1,06** -2,02** 
t-stat -0,48 -0,4 0,29 2,55 -2,04 
E/TA 0,47*** 0,41*** 0,19 0,86 -20,01*** 
t-stat 3,66 3,85 1,51 0,58 -2,84 
TCR 
 
-0,01 0,00 0,18 0,36 -0,65 
t-stat -0,54 0,02 0,87 1,51 -1,16 
Tier1 
 
0,02 -0,00 -0,04* -0,48* 0,4 
t-stat 0,68 -0,18 -1,75 -1,74 0,63 
Obs 
 
833 833 833 833 824 
Periods 10 10 10 10 10 
* denotes 10 % significance level, ** denotes 5 % significance level, *** denotes 1 % significance level. Notice that observations 
between variables vary. Some of the variables were not established with all of the banks in this study. 
table 3 defines all abbreviations used in this table 
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Capital funds to net loans (CF/NL) has highest impact on ROAE on 1 % significance 
level. The variable also affect cost to income ratio (CTRI) but on 5 % significance 
level. Other performance variables are not significantly affected by capital funds to net 
loans (CF/NL). Equity to liabilities (E/L) has highly significant impact on net interest 
margin (NIM), net interest revenue on average assets (NIRA) and cost to income ratio 
(CTRI). The impact on these variables is significant on 1 % level. Equity to liabilities 
(E/L) has not significant impact on recurring earning power and ROAE. 
 
Equity to net liabilities (E/NL) affects significantly on ROAE and cost to income ratio 
(CTRI). The impact on these variables is significant on 5 % level. Other performance 
variables are not significantly affected by equity to net liabilities (E/NL). Equity to 
total assets (E/TA) has highly significant impact on net interest margin (NIM), net 
interest revenue on average assets (NIRA) and negative significant impact on cost to 
income ratio. These impacts are significant on 1 % level. Recurring earning power 
(REP) and ROAE are not significantly affected by equity tot net liabilities (E/NL). 
 
Total capital ratio (TCR) has no significant impact on any of the performance 
variables. Tier 1 has negatively significant impact on recurring earning power and 
ROAE. The impact is significant on 10 % level. Table 13 shows total capital ratio 
(TCR) has no impact on any of the performance variables. Cost to income ratio 
(CTRI) is impacted by almost all of the capital structure variables. Other capital 
structure variables impact on performance variables. Capital funds to liabilities has a 
negative impact on all of the performance variables. Only two of these impacts are 
significant. The results shows that H3 can be accepted. The capital structure of banks 
affect bank performance over time. 
 
   4.5.  Results from data analysis 
 
This section completes the results of the panel regression analysis. Table 14 represents 
results of tables 11-13. H1 to H3 represent hypothesis’s. The regression analysis 
shows that all of the hypothesis’s are accepted in most of the cases. This table 
represents the distribution of hypothesis’s. Total capital ratio (TCR) impacts most of 
the performance variables on only hypothesis two, which states that capital structure 
during the financial crisis impacts on performance after the crisis period. It would be 
interesting to research why total capital ratio (TCR) has no significance impact on 
performance variables during the crisis period and over time. Other capital structure 
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variables impact on at least on of the performance variable in all time periods in this 
study.  
 
Different capital structure variables impact on different performance variables. All of 
the variables are impacted at some point on the study period. Equity to liabilities (E/L) 
and equity to total assets (E/TA) have similar impacts performance variables. These 
two variables along with Tier 1 variable have highest impact on performance variables 
in total.   
 
 
Table 14. Results. 
 
Variab. NIM NIRA REP ROAE CTRI 
C    H1 
H2 
H3 
H1 
H2 
H3 
CF/L H1 
 
 
H1 
 
H3 H2 
 
H1 
H3 
C/T H1 
 
 
H3 
 
 
H3 H1 
H2 
 
H1 
H3 
CF/NL  
 
 H1 H2 
H3 
 
H2 
H3 
E/L H1 
H2 
H3 
H1 
H2 
H3 
H2 
 
 
H1 
H2 
H1 
H3 
E/NL  
 
 
 
 
 
H1 
 
 
H2 
H3 
 
H2 
H3 
E/TA H1 
H3 
H1 
H2 
H3 
H2 
 
H1 
H2 
 
H1 
H3 
TCR H2 H2 H2 H2  
 
 
Tier 1 H1 
H2 
 
H1 
H2 
 
H2 
H3 
 
H2 
H3 
H2 
H3 
 
The result of this study is that banks capital structure affect bank performance in all 
three time periods. Capital structure before the crisis affect performance during the 
crisis period. Capital structure during the crisis period affect performance after the 
crisis period and over time, capital structure affects bank performance.  
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The results are ensured with robustness check. This study uses Hubers M method to 
check the robustness of the data. Table 15 represents the results of the robustness 
check. In table 15 all of the capital structure variables affect performance variables. 
The impact is highly significant in most of the variables. Results of the robustness 
check are similar to results of the panel regression analysis.  
 
 
Table 15. Robustness check. 
 
Variab. NIM NIRA REP ROAE CTRI 
C -0,23*** -0,19** -0,26*** 9,55*** 37,59*** 
z-stat -2,85 -2,53 -4,29 10,51 14,75 
CF/L -0,11*** -0,1*** -0,67*** -6,6*** -20,5*** 
z-stat -3,01 -3,16 -24,74 -16,37 -7,28 
C/T 0,17*** 0,18*** 0,88*** 8,51*** 24,8*** 
z-stat 3,53 3,84 23,46 15,24 6,82 
CF/NL -0,02 -0,02 -0,04*** -0,61*** 0,83* 
z-stat -1,22 -1,3 -3,52 -3,82 1,9 
E/L -0,17*** -0,15*** 0,47*** 6,62*** 15,48*** 
z-stat -3,69 -3,56 13,73 13,06 5,23 
E/NL 0,03 0,02 0,04*** 0,72*** -0,75 
z-stat 1,46 1,33 3,2 3,66 -1,4 
E/TA 0,4*** 0,36*** -0,5*** -8,62*** -17,28*** 
z-stat 6,43 6,23 -10,51 -12,29 -4,5 
TCR 
 
0,04*** 0,04*** 0,00 0,4*** -0,65** 
z-stat 3,7 3,63 0,4 3,53 -2,14 
Tier1 
 
-0,05*** -0,05*** -0,00 -0,55*** 0,31 
z-stat -4,43 -4,3 -0,46 -4,25 0,88 
Obs 
 
833 833 833 833 824 
* denotes 10 % significance level, ** denotes 5 % significance level, *** denotes 1 % significance level. Notice that observations 
between variables vary. Some of the variables were not established with all of the banks in this study. 
table 3 defines all abbreviations used in this table 
 
 
All of the capital structure variables impact on at least two of the performance 
variables. Even the total capital ratio (TCR), which had the least impact on hypothesis 
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one and three. Robustness check shows that ROAE is the most affected by the capital 
structure variables. The results remain similar to the panel regression analysis. All of 
the performance variables the capital structure variables on 1 % significance level. All 
of the performance variables are not impacted as much in the panel regression as in 
robust regression, but the results are similar.  
 
Robustness check shows that there are highly negative significant impacts among 
variables. Panel regression analysis does not show similar results. There are few 
negative impacts of these variables, but most of the impacts are positive.  
 
Results of the study remain similar after the robustness check. Banks’ capital structure 
before the financial crisis affect bank performance during the financial crisis 2007-
2008. Banks’ capital structure during the financial crisis affect bank performance after 
the financial crisis. Banks’ capital structure affect bank performance over time. All of 
the hypothesis’s are accepted. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Banks seem to have an optimal capital structure. By optimizing the capital structure, 
banks ensure, that they maximize their profits. Some studies suggest that the capital 
structure does not matter and even that corporations should maximize their amount of 
debt to maximize the profits. On the other hand, the more debt bank has, the more 
risks it takes, if something unexpected happens. When the crisis occurs banks with low 
amount of assets suffer and might end up insolvent. Other studies suggest that banks 
have capital buffers that protect them during the crisis periods.  
 
Crisis periods are the ultimate tests to banks. By researching banks performance 
during and after the crisis it is possible to examine banks operation on abnormal 
market environment. Financial crisis are a great stress test for banks. The banks 
operation during the crisis period shows how does banks capital structure and the 
regulations on capital structure actually work. Previous research shows that higher 
amount of capital helps banks to survive the crisis periods. Studies also show that 
banks usually keep higher amount of capital than they are required to keep.  
 
Banking crisis might not always be a result from financial crisis. Bank runs might 
cause enormous crisis’s in banks. The runs are caused by public, when for some 
reason, they do not trust banks ability to operate. This leads banks in crisis situation, 
when withdrawal activities become larger than expected. Banks might also “create” 
crisis of their own. Poor governance practices and principal-agent problems might lead 
to in-bank crisis, which can be even worse than crisis’s that come outside of the bank. 
 
The crisis period in this study is caused by macroeconomic reasons. The insolvency of 
Lehman Brothers led many banks and economies to financial crisis. The crisis begun 
with subprime loans, which were sold to investors. Even though Nordic banks do not 
use these kind of products they still suffered from the crisis. 
 
Capital structure can be measured in many different ways. Still the outcome of each 
ratio is similar. Unlike performance measures, all of the capital structure measures 
measure only capital structure. This study uses eight different capital structure 
variables. These variables are highly correlated with each other. Maybe the results 
might be different if there would have been one extra measure for capital structure that 
does not correlate with other capital structure variables. Although the amount of 
variables used in this study is high, so the results are reliable. 
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Performance measures do measure performance, but since performance can be 
measured from different angles and views the outcomes might differ from each other 
significantly. Banks performance might seem excellent in one ratio but terrible in 
other. That is why this study uses five different performance variables. This improves 
the reliability of the study. All of the performance variables do not correlate with each 
other, which proofs that the variables measure different angles of performance. This 
adds the reliability of this study. 
 
Banks performance is measured in different time periods: during the financial crisis, 
after the financial crisis and during the whole study period. Financial crisis can be seen 
as an event, which test the banks ability to operate in different environments. It is 
meaningless to examine banks performance in normal financial market conditions, 
since the banking activities are practiced for a long time. The data shows that banks 
performance was effected by the financial crisis and in some cases, the performance 
has not recovered back to its before crisis level. The results show that financial crisis 
impacted on banks performance. 
 
On the other hand some of the capital structure variables have improved after the crisis 
period. Especially tier 1 capital and total capital ratio have recovered fast after the 
crisis period. The regulations and risen amount of supervision might explain this. The 
new Basel accord sets higher capital requirements and banks in Nordic countries 
follow the given regulations. Banks have motivation to rise their capital buffers 
because of the regulation and recent financial crisis. The crisis of 2007-2008 affected 
the whole western world and banking industry. Even if banks perform well, the 
insolvency of other banks might affect their performance. So it is crucial, that banks 
have strong enough capital buffer to protect them from future crisis’s. 
 
It is important to notice that there are also other factors that affect banks performance. 
Performance in previous financial crisis’s predict the performance in the future 
financial crisis. Some studies show that corporate governance have an impact on 
performance as well. Bad corporate governance affects negatively on firms 
performance. One research suggest that shareholder friendly boards perform worse 
during the financial crisis than banks, which boards are not focusing on only 
shareholder profits. By maximizing shareholder value, the banks in that particular 
study take more risks to maximize shareholder value.  
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Banks co-operate with each others and with central banks. The insolvency of one bank 
may lead distrust on other banks and affect the whole banking industry. When Lehman 
Brothers fell, some other banks end up insolvent or merged with other banks in order 
to survive. Regulations of different countries and large institutions are set to prevent 
financial crisis’s. Banking activities are regulated by laws of the operating countries as 
well as European Union and Basel committee. National institutions supervise banking 
activities and give notes, if banks are not following the regulations. 
 
This study includes banks from four different countries: Denmark, Finland, Norway 
and Sweden. Norway is the only country that does not belong to the European Union. 
All of the countries in this study have similar laws and regulations on banking 
activities. Denmark, Finland and Sweden also follow the regulations from European 
Union. All countries included this study follow regulations of Basel committee. The 
regulations of Basel committee are designed to function in different banking 
environments. Since this study examines Nordic countries, the banking activities and 
regulations are quite similar from country to country.  
 
Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) have a lot in common 
especially in banking industry. All of the countries have banks, which operate in every 
Nordic country. The largest ones Nordea and Danske bank are operating in all Nordic 
countries and they have a large customer base in each country. So the banking industry 
in Nordic countries is highly integrated. All countries in this study have few major 
banks, which cover most of the banking activities. Nordea has a significant coverage 
in all Nordic countries expect in Norway. There are small bank in each country, but 
they are struggling to reach as much coverage as the large ones.  
 
This study examines only Nordic banks because most of the similar studies in this 
particular topic are done with US. or all EU countries. Nordic banking environment is 
quite different from large economies, so it is interesting to examine does the capital 
structure affect banks performance. Iceland is left outside of this study, because of its 
enormous banking crisis on 2008. Most of the largest banks in Iceland went insolvent 
and the whole financial markets in Iceland collapsed. The results of this study might 
have been significantly different, if Iceland would be included in this study.  
 
The results show that banks capital structure affect bank performance in the whole 
time period used in this study. Capital structure impacts on performance during the 
financial crisis 2007-2008 and after the crisis period. The regression analysis shows 
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that the results are significant. The results are slightly different in each performance 
variable, but overall banks capital structure has a huge impact on banks performance.  
 
The results are significant. Although it was expected that the capital structure affect 
performance it is quite interesting to see that not all performance variables are affected 
by capital structure. Total capital ratio has least impact on performance variables on 
hypothesis one and three.  
 
The regulations and supervision of banks seem to be the right way to control banking 
activities. Since capital structure is affecting banks performance it is extremely 
important that these regulations on capital are set. Capital requirements prevent banks 
from insolvency and by this decrease the risks of banks customers. For shareholders, 
the requirements might not be convenient, since the risks as well as profits shrink 
when banks cannot operate in highest possible level of leverage.  
 
It is interesting to see that most of the performance and capital structure variables still 
suffer from financial crisis on 2014. The crisis ended on 2008 and the banks are still 
suffering from it. It is mentionable, that this particular crisis affected banks and 
economies in al western countries. The crisis’s before this one were more local. The 
globalization have a huge impact on this. 
 
The data shows that all of the Nordic banks included this study suffered from financial 
crisis. Recovering from the crisis is slow and it is hard to say, when the damages of the 
crisis will be recovered. On 2014 most of the banks still suffer from the crisis. The 
data of 2015 and 2016 was not available when the data of this study was collected, so 
there might be some changes in past one and a half year. For some reason banks in 
Finland reacted later on the crisis than other Nordic banks. For further studies, it 
would be interesting to find out, why Finnish banks did not react to the crisis as fast as 
the other Nordic banks. Especially because some banks that operate in Finland also 
operate in other Nordic countries.  
 
The results show that total capital ratio has least impact on performance variables 
when the ratio is measured before the financial crisis and during the whole study 
period. It would be interesting to research why other capital structure variables have 
higher impact on performance variables and why total capital ratio impacts only when 
it is measured during the financial crisis period. This could be done to improve this 
study.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 1. Banks 
 
          Name                     City                  Country   TA  
1. Norges Bank OSLO NO 934 219 
2. Nordea Bank AB (publ) STOCKHOLM SE 812 604 
3 Danske Bank A/S COPENHAGEN K DK 564 089 
4. Nordea Bank Finland Plc NORDEA -
HELSINKI 
FI 420 296 
5. Svenska Handelsbanken STOCKHOLM SE 364 072 
6. DnB ASA OSLO NO 356 574 
7. Skandinaviska Enskilda BankenAB STOCKHOLM SE 341 396 
8. DNB Bank ASA OSLO 1 NO 317 899 
9. Swedbank AB STOCKHOLM SE 274 190 
10. Nykredit Realkredit A/S COPENHAGEN V DK 238 206 
11. Stadshypotek AB STOCKHOLM SE 136 863 
12. Realkredit Danmark A/S COPENHAGEN V DK 136 334 
13. Arbejdsmarkedets Tillaegspension-
ATP 
HILLEROED DK 134 541 
14. OP-Pohjola Group-OP Osuuskunta HELSINKI FI 134 062 
15. Nordea Bank Danmark Group-
Nordea Bank Danmark A/S 
COPENHAGEN C DK 133 516 
 
16. 
Swedbank Hypotek AB-Swedbank 
Mortgage AB 
STOCKHOLM SE 117 345 
17. Totalkredit A/S TAASTRUP DK 110 229 
18. OP-Pohjola Group Central 
Cooperative 
HELSINKI FI 89 982 
19. Jyske Bank A/S (Group) SILKEBORG DK 88 489 
20. Danmarks Nationalbank COPENHAGEN DK 87 639 
21. Nordea Bank Norge ASA OSLO NO 87 448 
22. Nykredit Group (Combined)   DK 86 906 
23. DNB Boligkreditt AS BERGEN NO 86 774 
24. Nordea Kredit Realkreditaktieselskab COPENHAGEN C DK 73 827 
25. Storebrand Group-Storebrand ASA OSLO NO 66 257 
26. Sveriges Riksbank STOCKHOLM SE 64 938 
27. Nordea Hypotek AB (publ) STOCKHOLM SE 63 481 
28. Pohjola Bank plc-Pohjola Pankki Oyj POHJOLA FI 61 555 
29. Kommunalbanken AS OSLO NO 61 301 
30. Suomen Pankki Finlands Bank Bank 
of Finland 
HELSINKI FI 57 936 
31. Länsförsäkringar AB STOCKHOLM SE 46 006 
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32. SBAB Bank AB STOCKHOLM SE 43 816 
33. BRF Kredit A/S LYNGBY DK 42 686 
34. AB Svensk Exportkredit-Swedish 
Export Credit Corporation 
STOCKHOLM SE 42 030 
35. Kommuninvest i Sverige AB OREBRO SE 40 335 
36. Sampo Plc HELSINKI FI 38 953 
37. Nykredit Bank A/S COPENHAGEN DK 37 554 
38. Municipality Finance Plc 
Kuntarahoitus Oyj 
HELSINKI FI 36 432 
39. Danske Bank Plc HELSINKI 7 FI 36 047 
40. KommuneKredit COPENHAGEN K DK 32 903 
41. SpareBank 1 Boligkreditt AS STAVANGER NO 30 632 
42. Länsförsäkringar Bank AB (Publ) STOCKHOLM SE 30 011 
43. Swedish Covered Bond Corporation 
(The) 
STOCKHOLM SE 29 528 
44. DLR Kredit A/S COPENHAGEN DK 25 752 
45. Sydbank A/S AABENRAA DK 24 883 
46. SpareBank 1 SR-Bank ASA STAVANGER NO 23 543 
47. Sparebanken Vest BERGEN NO 19 794 
48. Länsförsäkringar Hypotek AB STOCKHOLM SE 19 161 
49. SpareBank 1 SMN TRONDHEIM NO 16 965 
50. Nordea Eiendomskreditt AS OSLO NO 16 159 
51. SkandiaBanken Aktiebolag STOCKHOLM SE 14 878 
52. Fokus Bank ASA TRONDHEIM NO 14 542 
53. Aktia Bank Plc HELSINKI FI 12 998 
54. Santander Consumer Bank AS LYSAKER NO 12 954 
55. Spar Nord Bank AALBORG DK 12 877 
56. Sparebanken Sor KRISTIANSAND S NO 12 660 
57. OP Mortgage Bank HELSINKI FI 11 901 
58. Eksportfinans ASA OSLO NO 11 525 
59. Danmarks Skibskreditfond-Danish 
Ship Finance - DSF 
COPENHAGEN K DK 11 333 
60. Sparebank 1 Nord-Norge TROMSOE NO 11 196 
61. Eika Boligkreditt AS OSLO NO 10 942 
62. Landshypotek Bank AB STOCKHOLM SE 10 613 
63. Landshypotek Ekonomisk Förening STOCKHOLM SE 10 612 
64. Kommuninvest Cooperative Society - 
Kommuninvest Group 
OEREBRO SE 10 286 
65. The Savings Banks Group   FI 10 199 
66. Avanza Bank Holding AB STOCKHOLM SE 8 698 
67. Sparebanken Vest Boligkreditt As BERGEN NO 8 205 
68. Finnvera Plc KUOPIO FI 8 047 
69. Handelsbanken Finans AB STOCKHOLM SE 7 596 
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70. Sparebanken More AALESUND NO 7 578 
71. Helsinki OP Bank Plc HELSINKI FI 7 538 
72. Sparebank 1 Gruppen OSLO NO 7 415 
73. Sparebanken Hedmark HAMAR NO 6 721 
74. Arbejdernes Landsbank A/S COPENHAGEN V DK 6 555 
75. Nordnet AB STOCKHOLM SE 6 479 
76. Alm. Brand A/S COPENHAGEN DK 6 390 
77. Saxo Bank A/S HELLERUP DK 5 882 
78. Nordea Finans Sverige AB (Publ) 
Nordea Finance Sweden plc 
STOCKHOLM SE 5 854 
79. S-Pankki Oy HELSINKI FI 5 781 
80. Sparebanken Sogn og Fjordane FORDE NO 5 740 
81. Danske Civil- og Akademiingeniorers 
Pensionskasse DIP 
COPENHAGEN K DK 5 714 
82. Alandsbanken Abp-Bank of Aland 
Plc 
MARIEHAMN FI 5 211 
83. Sparbanken Oeresund AB MALMOE SE 5 199 
84. Obos BBL OSLO NO 5 177 
85. Nykredit Holding A/S COPENHAGEN DK 4 888 
86. BNbank ASA TRONDHEIM NO 4 817 
87. Bank 1 Oslo Akershus AS OSLO NO 4 788 
88. Sparebanken Ost DRAMMEN NO 4 711 
89. Storebrand Bank ASA OSLO NO 4 576 
90. Swedish Export Credits 
GuaranteeBoard-EKN 
STOCKHOLM SE 4 543 
91. SG Finans AS OSLO NO 4 526 
92. Norwegian Banks' Guarantee Fund-
Bankenes Sikringsfond 
OSLO NO 4 227 
93. KLP Banken AS TRONDHEIM NO 4 005 
94. Gjensidige Bank ASA FOERDE NO 3 970 
95. Sandnes Sparebank SANDNES NO 3 879 
96. FIH Erhvervsbank A/S-Finance for 
Danish Industry A/S - FIH Group 
COPENHAGEN DK 3 815 
97. Volvofinans Group-Volvofinans 
Bank AB 
GÖTEBORG SE 3 787 
98. Vestjysk Bank A/S LEMVIG DK 3 562 
99. Finansiel Stabilitet A/S COPENHAGEN DK 3 539 
100. Helgeland Sparebank MOSJOEN NO 3 472 
101. Ringkjoebing Landbobank RINGKJOEBING DK 3 469 
102. Oulun Osuuspankki OULU FI 3 447 
103. GE Money Bank AB STOCKHOLM SE 3 433 
104. IKANO Banken AB (Publ) ÄLMHULT SE 3 385 
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105. LR Realkredit A/S COPENHAGEN DK 3 327 
106. Sparekassen Sjaelland HOLBAEK DK 3 156 
107. SpareBank1 BV SANDEFJORD NO 3 076 
108. Sor Boligkreditt AS KRISTIANSAND NO 2 765 
109. Sparekassen Kronjylland RANDERS DK 2 730 
110. Aktia Hypoteksbank ABP-AktiaReal 
Estate Mortgage Bank Plc  
HELSINGFORS FI 2 710 
111. BankNordik P/F TORSHAVN-
FAROE ISLANDS 
DK 2 701 
112. KLP Kommunekreditt AS TRONDHEIM NO 2 695 
113. Fana Sparebank NESTTUN NO 2 692 
114. Industrikredit STOCKHOLM SE 2 681 
115. Sparebanken Telemark SKIEN NO 2 639 
116. Den Jyske Sparekasse GRINDSTED DK 2 627 
117. Sparebank Kreditt OSLO NO 2 610 
118. Resurs Bank AB HELSINGBORG SE 2 585 
119. SpareBank 1 Ringerike Hadeland HOENEFOSS NO 2 583 
120. LandKreditt AS OSLO NO 2 462 
121. SpareBank 1 Naeringskreditt AS STAVANGER NO 2 444 
122. Alandsbanken Asset Management AB STOCKHOLM SE 2 443 
123. LandKreditt Bank AS OSLO NO 2 428 
124. Sparebank 1 Ostfold Akershus MOSS NO 2 421 
125. Bankaktieselskabet Alm. Brand Bank COPENHAGEN V DK 2 354 
126. Jutlander Bank A/S AARS DK 2 307 
127. SEB Finans AB BROMMA SE 2 285 
128. Obosbanken AS OSLO NO 2 266 
129. Laan & Spar Bank A/S COPENHAGEN DK 2 237 
130. Marginalen Bank Bankaktiebolag STOCKHOLM SE 2 220 
131. Bank DnB A/S COPENHAGEN DK 2 193 
132. More Boligkreditt AS ALESUND NO 2 187 
133. Sparbanken Nord PITEA SE 2 171 
134. Swedbank Sjuhärad AB BORAS SE 2 103 
135. Sparekassen Vendsyssel VRAA DK 2 084 
136. Bolig- og Naeringskreditt AS TRONDHEIM NO 2 075 
137. Storebrand Boligkreditt AS LYSAKER NO 2 018 
138. Oma Saastopankki SEINAJOKI FI 1 965 
139. Totens Sparebank LENA NO 1 888 
140. Nordax Group AB STOCKHOLM SE 1 834 
141. Suomen Hypoteekkiyhdistys HELSINKI FI 1 821 
142. Norwegian Finans Holding ASA OSLO NO 1 807 
143. Bank Norwegian AS OSLO NO 1 805 
71	
144. Nordax Holding AB STOCKHOLM SE 1 789 
145. Nordax Bank AB STOCKHOLM SE 1 787 
146. Lounaismaan Osuuspankki SALO FI 1 787 
147. Danske Andelskassers Bank A/S TJELE DK 1 763 
148. Norfund OSLO NO 1 708 
149. Optia Savings Bank-
SäästöpankkiOptia 
IISALMI FI 1 664 
150. ICA Banken AB SOLNA SE 1 652 
151. Carnegie Investment Bank AB STOCKHOLM SE 1 608 
152. Selskabet af 1. september 2008 A/S ROSKILDE DK 1 571 
153. Sparebank 1 Nordvest KRISTIANSUND NO 1 569 
154. Sörmland Sparbank KATRINEHOLM SE 1 534 
155. Pareto Bank ASA OSLO NO 1 526 
156. Varbergs Sparbank AB VARBERG SE 1 518 
157. Gjensidige Bank Boligkreditt AS OSLO NO 1 464 
158. Eika Grupen AS OSLO NO 1 453 
159. Nordjyske Bank A/S FREDERIKSHAVN DK 1 451 
160. SEB Kort Bank AB STOCKHOLM SE 1 436 
161. Sparbanken Alingsas ALINGSAS SE 1 422 
162. Bustadkreditt Sogn og FjordaneAS-
SSF Bustadkreditt AS 
FORDE NO 1 402 
163. Marginalen AB STOCKHOLM SE 1 376 
164. BlueStep Finans AB STOCKHOLM SE 1 343 
165. BRFKredit Bank A/S LYNGBY DK 1 280 
166. Sparbanken Skaraborg AB SKARA SE 1 269 
167. Skue Sparebank NESBYEN NO 1 251 
168. Eik Banki P/F TORSHAVN -
FAROE ISLANDS 
DK 1 244 
169. Sparebanken Ost Boligkreditt As DRAMMEN NO 1 205 
170. SVEA Ekonomi AS STOCKHOLM SE 1 182 
171. Haugesund Sparebank HAUGESUND NO 1 178 
172. Sparbanken Rekarne AB ESKILSTUNA SE 1 154 
173. SpareBank 1 Hallingdal AL NO 1 150 
174. Alfred Berg Holding AB STOCKHOLM SE 1 134 
175. Sparebank 1 Sore Sunnmore VOLDA NO 1 130 
176. Sparebanken 1 Sore Sunmore VOLDA NO 1 124 
177. Pareto A/S OSLO NO 1 114 
178. Middelfart Sparekasse MIDDELFART DK 1 100 
179. Leaseplan Norge AS OSLO NO 1 094 
180. OP-Korttiyhtio Oyj HELSINKI FI 1 091 
181. Djurslands Bank A/S GRENAA DK 1 086 
182. Lægernes Pensionsbank A/S FREDERIKSBERG DK 1 062 
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183. Sparbanken Syd YSTAD SE 1 059 
184. Aurskog Sparebank AURSKOG NO 1 054 
185. Liedon Säästöpankki LIETO FI 1 032 
186. Falkenbergs Sparbank FALKENBERG SE 1 027 
187. Sparekillingsbanken   NO 1 017 
188. Westra Wermlands Sparbank ARVIKA SE 1 009 
189. Sparekassen Thy THISTED DK 1 000 
 
 	
